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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress substantially amended the Commodity Exchange Act
(the CEA)' in 19742 to provide additional protection to persons
trading in commodity futures contracts, commodity options, and
"leverage" transactions3 and to place such transactions within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion (CFTC).4 As the result, however, of continued abuses in com-
modity options and increased public trading5 in exotic, new
financial futures such as stock index6 and Government National
Mortgage Association (GNMA) futures contracts,7 Congress twice
recently has significantly amended the CEA to broaden those pro-
tections.' This Article reviews customer rights and remedies now
available under the CEA. Specifically, part II of this Article ex-
plores the scope of transactions covered by the CEA,9 part III ad-
dresses the antifraud provisions of the CEA,10 and part IV dis-
cusses the standard of intent required to prove that fraud has been
1. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1982).
2. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat.
1389.
3. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1982).
4. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
5. In 1972, 18.3 million commodity futures contracts were traded in the United States.
By 1982 that volume had increased to 112.4 million contracts. 9 Futures Industry Associa-
tion Report 6 (Feb. 1973); see COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, COMMOD-
ITY FUTURES REGULATION-CURRENT STATUS AND UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS 1 (July 15, 1982).
"Last year, trading volume in financial futures soared to 42 million contracts from 29 mil-
lion just a year earlier and 3.9 million five years before." N. Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1983, at 3,
col. 1. In 1982 approximately 30 million financial futures contracts and 45 million agricul-
tural commodity futures contracts (e.g., soybeans and pork bellies) were traded, a decline in
the latter from some 60 million contracts in 1980 and an increase in the former in that same
year from some 15 million contracts. Id.
6. A stock index futures contract is a theoretical agreement to purchase a portfolio of
stocks based on an index such as Value Line or the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Unlike an
ordinary futures contract, actual delivery is not permitted with a stock index future con-
tract. Markham & Gilberg, Washington Watch: Stock Index Futures, 6 CORP. L. REV. 59, 61
(1983).
7. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, TREASURY/FEDERAL RESERVE STUDY OF TREASURY FU-
TURES MARKETS (May 1979). For an examination of the SEC's authority to regulate trading
in GNMA certificates, see Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir.) (prohibiting
trading of GNMA's pending action by the CFTC denying the authority of the SEC to regu-
late such trading), vacated as.moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982).
8. See Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983) (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)); Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92
Stat. 865 (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).
9. See infra notes 16-41 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 42-178 and accompanying text.
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committed under CEA provisions.11 Part V of this Article examines
the secondary liability of brokerage firms and others for the fraud-
ulent acts of its employees, 12 part VI discusses fiduciary liability
under the CEA,' 3 and part VII enumerates the various forums
available for customer remedies." This Article concludes in part
VIII with suggestions for improving dispute resolution in the com-
modity industry. 15
II. TRANSACTIONS SUBJECT TO THE CEA
A. Commodity Futures Transactions
A commodity futures contract is a legally binding commitment
to purchase or sell a specified quantity of a commodity with deliv-
ery effected at a specified time in the future. The terms of a fu-
tures contract are standardized, with the exception of the price,
which is determined by market forces.' 6 Commodity futures con-
tracts are traded on margin,'7 which allows substantial leverage
that may compound gains or losses as the price of the commodity
changes. If such fluctuations are adverse to the customer's posi-
tions, the customer will be required to post additional "variation"
or "maintenance" margin payments at least roughly equal to the
amount of loss caused to the investor by the adverse market
move." Margin calls must be met promptly, and if they are not so
11. See infra notes 179-204 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 205-19 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 220-36 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 237-54 and accompanying text.
15. See infra part VIII.
16. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 357-
58 (1982). For example, a futures contract on silver traded on the Commodity Exchange,
Inc. (COMEX) provides for delivery of 5000 ounces of silver at a stated time in the future
and at a price negotiated by the parties upon execution of the contract. The seller of the
futures contract undertakes an obligation to deliver 5000 ounces of silver, and is therefore
said to have taken a "short" position (i.e., he is "short" the silver). The purchaser of the
contract, required to accept delivery of the silver, is referred to as taking a "long" position.
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS IN RESPONSE TO SEC-
TION 21 OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT, PUB. L. No. 96-276, ch. II, at 6, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 7, 94 Stat. 542 (1980) [hereinafter cited as CFTC SILVER REPORT.
17. The margin on a commodity futures account, unlike its counterpart in the securi-
ties industry, does not represent an extension of credit, but is a "performance bond" or
"earnest money" which serves as an assurance of the customer's good faith performance
under the terms of the futures contract. Both the purchaser and seller of the futures con-
tract are required to post margin payments. The amount of margin required is fixed as that
amount deemed necessary to assure performance. The initial margin requirement generally
represents a small percentage of the total value of the futures contract. CFTC SILVER RE-
PORT, supra note 16, ch. II, at 8.
18. P. JOHNSON, COMMODITIES REGULATION § 1.10, at 31, 32 (1982).
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met, the broker has the right, and may be required by exchange
rules,19 to liquidate the customer's account. The risks of commod-
ity futures trading are thus accentuated by the potential necessity
for the customer to raise and commit sizable amounts of additional
liquid funds, often in a very short period of time.
Trading risks are exacerbated further through imposition of
"price limits" by contract markets, which restrict the extent to
which the price of a particular commodity may drop ("limit
down") or increase ("limit up") in the course of a trading day.
Designed to maintain orderly trading in the market, these price
limits may force an investor to maintain a loss position.2 °
Investors may engage in commodity futures trading solely for
speculative purposes. A speculator taking a "long" position21 in a
particular commodity anticipates an increase in the price of that
commodity prior to the delivery date. If the price rises he is able to
sell the commodity at a market price higher than his purchase
price and profit from the transaction. Conversely, if the price falls
he will be obligated to sell the commodity at a price below the
purchase price and will suffer a loss. Accordingly, the trader is
speculating against the future price of the commodity.
2
Trading commodity futures contracts also may be used to
"hedge" business risks.2 3 For example, an institution with a widely
based stock portfolio or that is anticipating an overall drop in
stock market values for a short term may, instead of selling the
portfolio, hedge that market risk by entering into a stock index
futures contract. This futures contract would reflect the overall
drop in market prices and allow the institution to receive profits
from the transaction that would offset, at least to some extent,
losses in the institution's portfolio.
2 4
19. See, e.g., Margin Rule H of the COMEX.
20. See, e.g., Silver Trading Rule 5 of the COMEX. If a maximum price limit is
reached (i.e., a "limit up" or "limit down" market), a futures trader might be unable to
liquidate a position (except possibly under a complicated "switching" arrangement), because
maximum losses are "locked in" at the prevailing cash price for the commodity. The exis-
tence of a "locked limit" market may, therefore, force the trader to maintain a loss position
and, if price limits continue over a number of days or become even more restrictive, increase
the trader's losses.
21. A "long" position is the posture taken by the purchaser of the futures contract.
See supra note 16.
22. See CFTC SILVER REPORT, supra note 16, ch. II, at 6; P. JOHNSON, supra note 18, §
1.14.
23. P. JOHNSON, supra note 18, § 1.12.
24. Markham & Gilberg, supra note 6, at 61. Only a very small percentage of all fu-
tures contracts result in the actual delivery of a physical commodity. Id. at 60 & n.5. In-
[Vol. 37:1299
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B. Commodity Options Transactions
A commodity option contract is a right for a limited period of
time to purchase or sell a specified amount of a commodity or a
commodity futures contract at a specified exercise or "striking"
price. 25 The option right expires unless exercised by the purchaser.
The writer of the option right pays a premium to the seller for the
right. The option to buy is referred to as a call option, while the
right to sell is commonly referred to as a put option.26 Unlike com-
modity futures contracts, options offer the advantage of limiting
the holder's liability to the amount of the premium paid while of-
fering the opportunity to profit through a leveraged investment.
The writer of an option, however, is liable to the full extent of any
price changes. Therefore, the risk to the seller of a call option is
comparable to that of a futures contract, although the option
writer's losses are offset by the amount of the premium paid.21
Various forms of commodity options exist including "dealer"
options which are backed by an inventory of the commodity, "na-
ked" options which are not backed by anything other than the
credit of the writer of the option, "London" options which are
traded on the London markets, and, today, options traded on
United States contract markets.28 Commodity options trading his-
torically has been a matter of concern under the CEA because of
the many abuses that have arisen in connection with these instru-
ments.29 Those abuses were a precipitating factor in the enactment
of the CEA and the creation of the CFTC in 1974,30 when the
CFTC was granted exclusive jurisdiction over commodity op-
tions.3 1 The CFTC, however, was unable to stem a flood of "boiler
room" operations, including one scandal concerning an escaped
stead, the majority of commodity futures traders "liquidate" their contractual obligations by
assuming an "offsetting" position. For example, a trader with a "long" position in a com-
modity may, rather than accepting delivery, enter into a "short" position in the same com-
modity for delivery in the same month. The trader would then hold both sides of the futures
contract and extinguish the obligation. CFTC SWLVER REPORT, supra note 16, ch. II, at 6.
25. P. JOHNSON, supra note 18, § 1.07, at 16.
26. Id.
27. See generally Markham & Gilberg, Stock and Commodity Options-Two Regula-
tory Approaches and Their Conflicts, 47 ALB. L. REV. 741, 756-59 (1983) (the authors dis-
cuss, inter alia, the mechanics of commodity option trading).
28. Id. at 757-59.
29. For a discussion of the nature and history of commodity options and their abuses,
see P. JOHNSON, supra note 18, § 1.07; Lower, The Regulation of Commodity Options, 1978
DuKE L.J. 1095, 1098-99; Markham & Gilberg, supra note 27, at 747-56.
30. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1974).
31. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2, 6c (1982).
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felon who operated a commodity firm on a nationwide basis.2 As a
result of those scandals, the CFTC33 and later Congress34 imposed
a moratorium on all commodity options sales with the exception of
certain "dealer" and commercial options and, more recently on a
limited basis, commodity options traded on United States
exchanges. 5
C. Leverage Transactions
The CFTC also is given exclusive jurisdiction over so-called
"leverage" transactions .3 Leverage transactions generally contain a
standardized agreement to purchase a specified quantity of a com-
modity such as gold or silver. The purchaser pays a portion of the
purchase price at the outset and agrees to buy the commodity at a
specified price with a delivery date at a specified time in the fu-
ture. In addition to the initial payment, purchasers must pay a
sales commission or markup along with maintenance, interest, and
other finance charges connected with the seller's theoretical obliga-
tion to carry the commodity for the purchaser during the term of
the contract. Actually, leverage merchants may not own the com-
modity but instead protect themselves through offsetting futures
contracts or other means.
3 7
The CFTC has imposed a moratorium on the expansion of
trading in leverage contracts with one exception. A grandfather
provision was adopted that allowed firms already engaged in lever-
age contract trading to continue.38 The CFTC also, at one point,
determined to regulate leverage contracts as futures contracts,
which effectively would have banned their sale.39 The CFTC later
32. See Kelley v. Carr, 442 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) T 21,025 (6th Cir. May 16,
1980); Markham & Gilberg, supra note 27, at 763-68; see also CFTC v. Crown Colony Com-
modity Options, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); CFTC v. J.S. Love & Assoc. Op-
tions, Ltd., 422 F. Supp. 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); In re British Am. Commodity Corp., [1977-
1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) T 20,526 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 2, 1977).
33. 17 C.F.R. § 32.11 (1984).
34. 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1982).
35. 17 C.F.R. § 33 (1984). See generally Markham & Gilberg, supra note 27, at 759-69.
36. 7 U.S.C. § 23 (1982).
37. See Matthews v. Monex Int'l, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 20,791 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 16, 1979).
38. See 17 C.F.R. § 31.1 (1984).
39. Leverage contracts are not traded on futures contract markets. Congress author-
ized the CFTC, by amendment to the CEA in 1974, to determine whether leverage transac-
tions should be regulated in the same manner as futures contracts, which are required to be
traded on exchanges. See S. REP. No. 1131, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1974). That determina-
tion was made by the CFTC in 1979. See Regulation of Leverage Transactions as Contracts
1304 [Vol. 37:1299
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postponed the implementation of that decision,40 however, and
more recently Congress amended the CEA to require the CFTC to
adopt a comprehensive regulatory scheme for such transactions, to
remove the grandfather restriction, and to prevent the treatment
of such transactions as futures contracts.4'
III. CUSTOMER RIGHT TO PROTECTION FROM FRAUD
UNDER THE CEA
A principal protection for customers under the CEA is its an-
tifraud prohibitions. One such provision, section 6b,4 makes it un-
lawful for any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
futures contracts, "to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or de-
fraud" any other person, to make or cause to be made any false
statement or misrepresentation, or to "bucket" 43 a customer's or-
der by failing to execute such order on a contract market. In addi-
tion, the CEA contains an express antifraud prohibition governing
the activities of commodity pool operators and commodity trading
advisors." The CFTC also has adopted antifraud rules for futures
contracts traded on foreign exchanges,4 5 commodity options trans-
actions,4 ' and leverage transactions.47 The following discussion out-
lines various fraud claims that have been made under the CEA and
the corresponding CFTC attempts to develop those theories.
A. Suitability
The concept of "suitability" is traceable to securities exchange
rules that required brokers to "know your customer"; a broker
for Future Delivery, 44 Fed. Reg. 44,177 (1979); see also In re First Nat'l Monetary Corp.,
[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,707 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 29, 1983).
40. See Regulation of Leverage Transactions as Contracts for Future Delivery; Post-
ponement of Effective.Date, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,304 (1979).
41. See Futures Trading Act of 1982, H.R. REP. No. 964, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 50, 51;
Horwitz & Markham, Sunset on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Scene II, 39
Bus. LAW. 67, 86-97 (1983). Congress allowed the CFTC to prohibit leverage contracts in
any commodity that was not already the subject of leverage trading on December 9, 1982, if
the CFTC determined that such trading was contrary to public interest. Futures Trading
Act of 1982, H.R. REP. No. 964, supra, at 50. The CFTC has issued interim final rules to
govern leverage transactions on commodities already the subject of trading. Regulation of
Certain Leverage Transactions, 49 Fed. Reg. 5498 (1984).
42. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982).
43. Id.; see infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
44. 7 U.S.C. § 60 (1982).
45. 17 C.F.R. § 30.02 (1984).
46. Id. § 32.9.
47. Id. § 31.3 ; see Mitchell v. Premex, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur.
L. REP. (CCH) I 21,678 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 10, 1983).
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must assure itself that its customers are able to meet their obliga-
tions.4 s This duty was later expanded to impose an obligation on
securities brokers to refrain from making recommendations to cus-
tomers that were not suitable in light of the customers' finances,
needs, and objectives.49 This expansion, however, of the "know
your customer" rule has not been broadly applied. Its use is most
frequently confined to "boiler room" operations that utilize high
pressure telephone sales campaigns for speculative low price
securities.50
At an early stage of its existence, the CFTC was faced with
numerous "boiler room" sales operations. These operations gener-
ally involved the offer and sale of commodity options without any
consideration of the suitability of those transactions for individual
customers.5 1 For example, in CFTC v. Crown Colony Commodity
Options, Ltd.,52 the district court held that the defendant had en-
gaged in fraud by operating "a 'boiler room' operation calculated
to sell as large a volume of options as possible to customers
throughout the United States without regard to the suitability of
the investment for customers . . . ., The court noted that the
defendants were "crass and callous" in their indifference to the
needs of their customers. 4 Similarly, in Kelley v. Carr,55 defen-
dants also participated in a "boiler room" operation. The district
court concluded that the defendants had made no attempt to
counsel clients or to consider their financial position to determine
whether customers could realistically afford to purchase the com-
modity options being offered.5 6
As a result of these types of abuses, the CFTC proposed a rule
that would prohibit persons registered with the CFTC from recom-
48. See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange Rule 405.
49. See 17 C.F.R. § 106-3 (1984); N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS & T. Russo, REGULATION OF
BROKERS, DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS T 2.08 (1977).
50. See N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS & T. Russo, supra note 49, q 2.08, at 2-36.
51. See Lower, supra note 29, at 1095, 1098-99; Schobel & Markham, Commodity Op-
tions - A New Industry or Another Debacle?, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 347 (Special
Supp.) (Apr. 7, 1976).
52. 434 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
53. Id. at 918 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 919.
55. 442 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd in pertinent part and rev'd in part on
other grounds, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) T 21,025 (6th Cir.
May 16, 1980).
56. Id. For a discussion of these and other "boiler room" cases, see Schief & Markham,
The Nation's "Commodity Cops" - Efforts by the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion to Enforce the Commodity Exchange Act, 34 Bus. LAW. 19, 21-26 (1978).
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mending a commodity transaction to a customer unless that cus-
tomer was determined to be suitable for the transaction." The
CFTC subsequently concluded, however, that the adoption of such
a rule merely would codify principles already implicit in the Act
and unintentionally narrow the scope of existing standards.58 Not-
withstanding the CFTC's failure to adopt a suitability rule, various
CFTC administrative law judges thereafter held that the CEA con-
templated suitability violations.5 9 The CFTC subsequently stated,
however, that it rejected an administrative law judge's suggestion
that there was a suitability requirement implicit in the CEA ° In
another decision,"' the CFTC expressly disavowed the decision of
another administrative law judge who had stated that suitability is
a basis for recovery under the CEA.62 In addition, the Eighth Cir-
57. The proposed rule stated that a registrant could not recommend a trade unless:
(1) . . . the professional obtained from the customer, before the recommendation
or trade, the essential facts about the customer's financial condition and trading objec-
tives . . . ; and (2) . . . the professional had reason to believe, at the time of the rec-
ommendation or trade, that the position would be 'suitable' for the customer based on
the information known to the professional. The suitability of a position would depend
on whether the risk of loss involved was (a) one that the customer could safely assume
in light of his financial condition and (b) consistent with the customer's trading
objectives.
Proposed Standards of Conduct for Commodity Trading Professionals for the Protection of
Customers, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,742, 44,743 (1977) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1, 166) (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Proposed Standards of Conduct].
58. Adoption of Customer Protection Rules, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,886, 31,889 (1978).
59. For example, in Dwyer v. Murlas Bros. Commodities, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) T 20,520 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 21, 1977), a CFTC administra-
tive law judge held that a widow who was solicited by a salesman at her husband's funeral
and whose income was insufficient to meet her expenses was an unsuitable client for com-
modity futures transactions that were financed through the proceeds of her deceased hus-
band's life insurance policy. See also Guzy v. Chartered Sys. Corp., [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,081 (C.F.T.C. July 14, 1980); Zoldessy v. Thomson
& McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,798 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 19, 1979); Russo v. Gregory Commodity Options, Inc., [1977-
1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,513 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 4, 1977); cf. Ro-
senbaum v. E.F. Hutton & Co., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
T 20,954 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 3, 1979).
60. Avis v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L.
REP. (CCH) 21,379, at 25,830 n.4 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 13, 1982) (citations omitted). The CFTC's
chief administrative law judge in a subsequent case concluded that the CFTC's decision in
Avis "foreclosed any suggestion that suitability principles may be implicit even in the an-
tifraud provisions of the Act." Vaneck v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,697, at 26,733 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 30, 1983).
61. Jensen v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT.
L. REP. (CCH) 21,062 (C.F.T.C. July 28, 1981).
62. Id. at 24,286. Subsequent decisions of CFTC administrative law judges have ac-
cordingly declined to find a right of action for suitability. See, e.g., Kats v. Merrill Lynch
Commodities, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,998
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cuit held in Myron v. Hauser63 that because the CFTC had not
developed any suitability standard, the court could not find a vio-
lation of the CEA on the basis of a claim of suitability.6 4 More
recently a district court relying on Myron and the CFTC's earlier
decisions,6 5 held that no suitability requirement exists under the
CEA.6 Similarly, another district court held that there was no
suitability standard under the CEA because of the difficulty that
the CFTC had encountered in formulating meaningful standards
of universal application. 7
These decisions should not be construed, however, as a CFTC
determination that customer suitability protection is not war-
ranted. Rather, the CFTC has substituted specific disclosure re-
quirements that advise the customers in simple boldface language
of the risks they face in commodities trading. Thus, the CFTC im-
poses upon the customer, rather than the broker, the duty to as-
sess trading risks in determining whether to accept a broker's rec-
ommendation. 8 For example, the CFTC recently approved a pilot
program for exchanges that trade in commodity options. The spec-
ified disclosures that the program requires commodity brokers to
make to customers contain a provision which states that commod-
ity option trading is not suitable for everyone, and investors should
consider their own situations to determine whether such trading is
suitable for them. 9
(C.F.T.C. Feb. 3, 1984); Hatami v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,800 (C.F.T.C. June 30, 1983); Ryan v. Pearson,
[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) N 21,741 (C.F.T.C. May 27, 1983);
Vaneck v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 21,697 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 30, 1983).
63. 673 F.2d 994 (8th Cir. 1982).
64. Id. at 1005-06; see also Sherry v. Diercks, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,221 (Wash. Ct. App. May 26, 1981) (state court held that a suitability
claim could not be made under the CEA or under state common law because the customer
maintained a nondiscretionary commodity futures trading account). But see International
Cattle Sys. v. Parsons, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,367 (D.
Kan. Mar. 9, 1982) (district court denied summary judgment on suitability claims without
analysis of whether suitability exists under the CEA).
65. See supra notes 60 & 63 and accompanying text.
66. Hoetger & Co. v. Asencio, 558 F. Supp. 1361, 1364 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
67. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc. v. Quinard, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT.
L. REP. (CCH) 21,686 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 1983); accord Applegate v. Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,881 (S.D. Fla. Jan.
17, 1983).
68. See Adoption of Customer Protection Rules, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,886, 31,888 (1978).
69. This disclosure requirement states in part that:
BECAUSE OF THE VOLATILE NATURE OF THE COMMODITIES MARKETS THE PURCHASE AND
GRANTING OF COMMODITY OPTIONS INVOLVE A HIGH DEGREE OF RISK. COMMODITY OPTION
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The suitability issue also remains unresolved by the CFTC
and in the courts. In a recent decision by the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, the court stated that the Commission had not
actually rejected a suitability right of action in the Jensen and
Avis cases. The CFTC, rather, had simply "reserved the question
whether a suitability requirement is implicit in the Act. '70 Follow-
ing the lead of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, a CFTC
administrative law judge concluded that there is a suitability right
of action under the Act, rejecting the decisions in Myron and
Hoetger and concluding that the Jensen and Avis cases did not
undercut a right of suitability.
7'
B. Misrepresentations
The prohibitions against misleading and deceptive statements
contained in section 4b and other provisions" of the CEA provide
the principal CEA customer protection from high pressure "boiler
room" commodity option solicitations. For example, in CFTC v.
J.S. Love & Associates Options Ltd.,3 the district court concluded
that the promotional literature and the New York Times adver-
tisement of an option firm was misleading because, while these
materials promised large profits and limited risk, the advertise-
ments failed to state that many of the firm's salespersons were in-
experienced, the firm's charges for options were exorbitant, profit-
ability claims were unsubstantiated in the advertisement, and
commodity options trading "is often highly speculative and is usu-
ally engaged in by sophisticated investors. '74 Similarly, in CFTC v.
Crown Colony Commodity Options, Ltd.,75 the court held that the
commodity options sales presentations at issue were fraudulent be-
TRANSACTIONS ARE NOT SUITABLE FOR MANY MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC. SUCH TRANSACTIONS
SHOULD BE ENTERED INTO ONLY BY PERSONS WHO HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD THIS DIS-
CLOSURE STATEMENT AND WHO UNDERSTAND THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THEIR RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS AND OF THE RISKS INVOLVED IN THE OPTION TRANSACTIONS COVERED BY THIS
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT.
17 C.F.R. § 33.7 (1984); see also id. §§ 1.55 (disclosure requirements for brokers), 4.21 (dis-
closure requirements for commodity pool operators), 4.31 (disclosure requirements for com-
modity trading advisors).
70. Schor v. CFTC, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,297, at 29,475 n.12 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 10, 1984).
71. Phacelli v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,345
(C.F.T.C. Sept. 12, 1984).
72. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 60 (1982); 17 C.F.R. §§ 30.02, 32.9 (1983).
73. 422 F. Supp. 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
74. Id. at 655-56.
75. 434 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
1984] 1309
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1299
cause they "conveyed the distinct impression that extraordinary
short-term profits were all but certain to be realized by investors"
and because the mechanics of commodity options trading were
misrepresented. 6 Numerous other commodity options cases found
fraud in promoters' failure to disclose the absence of a secondary
market in commodity options, 77 commissions and other charges,
7 8
the fundamentals of options trading, 9 the lack of registration and
experience of commodity options salespersons,"' and pertinent
risks."
76. Id. at 916-17.
77. Wong v. First London Commodity Options, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,834 (C.F.T.C. May 29, 1979).
78. Ettingshaus v. Chartered Sys. Corp., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) T 20,897 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 19, 1979); Pickens v. Lloyd, Carr & Co., [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) T 20,721 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 11, 1978); Morgan v.
Crown Colony Commodity Options, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 20,622 (C.F.T.C. June 8, 1978); Wolfe v. First Dover Commodities, Ltd., [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,585 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 30, 1978).
79. Hearn v. Economic Sys. Commodities, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,802 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 9, 1979) (violations found but decision vacated
because of bankruptcy proceedings); Conti v. Gregory Commodity Options, Inc., [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] COMM. PUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,722 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 12, 1978); Pickens v.
Lloyd, Carr & Co., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,721
(C.F.T.C. Dec. 11, 1978); Siebenthaler v. First Dover Commodities, Ltd., [1977-1980 Trans-
fer Binder] COMM. PUT. L. REP. (CCH) T 20,707 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 14, 1978); Akmajian v. Inter-
national Commodity Options, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
T 20,584 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 29, 1978); Coffman v. Economic Sys. Commodities, Inc., [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) V 20,581 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 28, 1978); Flasman v.
R.G. Wilson Commodities, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
20,572 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 13, 1978); Sandberg v. Gregory Commodity Options, Inc., [1977-
1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,547 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 20, 1978).
80. Woodman v. London Commodity Options, Ltd., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) T 21,021 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 29, 1980); Herzig v. British Am. Com-
modity Options Corp., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,936
(C.F.T.C. Sept. 29, 1979); Bassilios v. Lloyd, Carr & Co., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM.
PUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,641 (C.F.T.C. July 5, 1978), vacated in part on other grounds,
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,749 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 24, 1979);
Troll v. Lloyd, Carr & Co., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,626
(C.F.T.C. June 16), vacated in part on other grounds, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,676 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 22, 1978); Sandberg v. Gregory Commodity
Options, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,547 (C.F.T.C.
Jan. 20, 1978); Russo v. Gregory Commodity Options, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) T 20,513 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 4, 1977).
81. Conti v. Gregory Commodity Options, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,722 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 12, 1978); Pickens v. Lloyd, Carr & Co., [1977-
1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,721 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 11, 1978);
Siebenthaler v. First Dover Commodities, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) T 20,707 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 14, 1978); White v. R.G. Wilson Commodities, Inc.,
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. PUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,682 (C.F.T.C. July 26, 1978),
vacated in part on other grounds, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
1310
1984] CUSTOMER RIGHTS 1311
The CFTC also has warned that unwarranted profit predic-
tions in connection with commodity options transactions are "in-
herently fraudulent" whether expressed in terms of opinion or
fact.2 The CFTC's Office of General Counsel similarly has stated
that section 4b of the CEA prohibits any suggestion or claim of
profit potential that does not fairly represent the possibility of loss
and has proscribed any predictions or recommendations that are
not explicitly labeled or do not have a reasonable basis in fact.8 3
CFTC administrative law judges have concluded that section 4b is
violated when a customer is promised that losses will be limited,
8 4
20,776 (C.F.T.C., Mar. 12, 1979); Bassilios v. Lloyd, Carr & Co., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,641 (C.F.T.C. July 5, 1978), vacated in part on other
grounds, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,749 (C.F.T.C., Jan.
24, 1979); Troll v. Lloyd, Carr & Co., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,626 (C.F.T.C. June 16), vacated in part on other grounds, [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,676 (C.F.T.C., Sept. 22, 1978); Banks v. CIC Int'l,
11977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,621 (C.F.T.C. June 1, 1978);
Akmajian v. International Commodity Options, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,584 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 29, 1978); Sokol v. Gregory Commodity Op-
tions, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,582 (C.F.T.C. Mar.
28, 1978); Coffman v. Economic Sys. Commodities, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUr. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,581 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 28, 1978); Albany Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Hofmann,
Kavanaugh Commodity Corp., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
20,545 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 12, 1978); Russo v. Gregory Commodity Options, Inc., [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,513 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 4, 1977); Prochniak v.
First Commodity Corp., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) N 20,501
(C.F.T.C. Oct. 7, 1977), review denied, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,736 (C.F.T.C., Jan. 5, 1979). For a boiler room case in the context of commodity
futures contracts, see In re Earl K. Riley Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 21,679 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 28, 1983).
82. In re British Am. Commodity Options Corp., Nos. 76-15 and 77-3 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 2,
1977), noted in [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. 1 20,526 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 2,
1977), and in Schief & Markham, supra note 56, at 25; see also Hauser v. Rosenthal & Co.,
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,731 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 4, 1979);
Coffman v. Economic Sys. Commodities, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUr. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 20,581 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 28, 1978).
83. CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 77-16 [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 20,498 (Oct. 18, 1977). This letter from the general counsel also stated:
A purported compilation of a record of past performance, which is disseminated by any
means, would also violate Section 4b(2) unless it is based upon actual trades executed
in the market place and fairly represents results achieved for comparable periods as
well as for the period specifically set forth. Proscribed as well are the use of unwar-
ranted superlatives or inflammatory statements, which tend to encourage trading on an
emotional, rather than a reasoned basis.
Id. at 22,065.
84. See, e.g., Kupser v. Chartered Sys. Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur.
L. REP. (CCH) 21,717 (C.F.T.C. May 6, 1983); Pettyjohn v. Traders Inv. Corp., [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,667 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 16, 1983); In re Citadel
Trading Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 21,238 (C.F.T.C.
Aug. 31, 1981); Beshara v. Spath, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH)
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material information or the mechanics of futures trading are not
disclosed, 5 claims of large profit and limited risk are made, 6 in-
ducements are promised that give undue expectations of profit,
81
20,616 (C.F.T.C. May 25, 1978); Carfield v. Comstock Inv. Management Corp., [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) T 20,607 (C.F.T.C. May 11, 1978); LeBallister
v. Lincolnwood Commodities, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
20,538 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 21, 1977); Allison v. Bache Halsey Stuart, [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,502 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 28, 1977). See generally Shaver
v. Ansell, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,044 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 1,
1984); Ward v. Stanford Management Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L.
REP. (CCH) q 21,979 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 27, 1984).
85. See, e.g., Doran v. Yorkstone Research, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] ComM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,932 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 9, 1983), petition for review denied, [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,213 (C.F.T.C. May 15, 1984); Newman v.
Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
21,811 (C.F.T.C. July 19, 1983); Zavish v. International Precious Metals Corp., [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,775 (C.F.T.C. July 19, 1983); Mitchell v.
Premex, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] (CCH) 21,678 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 10, 1983); Troy v.
Young, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,441 (C.F.T.C. July 14,
1982); Lechtreck v. Commodity Inv. Counselors, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 21,402 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 14, 1982); Polissar v. Nelson, Ghun & Assocs., [1980-
1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) T 21,288 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 5, 1981); Yameen
v. Madda Trading Co., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,536
(C.F.T.C. Nov. 9, 1977); Allison v. Bache Halsey Stuart, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,502 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 28, 1977). See generally Kerr v. First Commod-
ity Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,119 (8th Cir. May 9,
1984); Sullivan v. Highfield Commodities, Ltd., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L.
REP. (CCH) 22,040 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 14, 1984); Cox v. Eastern Capital Corp., [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,009 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 16, 1984); Laub v.
Braverman, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,000 (C.F.T.C. Feb.
3, 1984); Cole v. E.F. Hutton & Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
21,995 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 31, 1984); Nesting v. Boston Trading Group, Inc., [1982-84 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,917 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 28, 1983); Rosenfeld v.
Chartered Sys. Corp., [1982-84 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,730
(C.F.T.C. May 17, 1983); Hopkins v. Stanford Management Co., [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) T 21,836 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 30, 1983).
86. Gary Oakland Enters. v. R.B. Thompson Assocs., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) T 21,757 (C.F.T.C. June 17, 1983); Pettyjohn v. Traders Inv.
Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,667 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 16,
1983); Aurora Nova Corp. v. Domestic Oil Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT.
L. REP. (CCH) T 21,634 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 22, 1982); Carfield v. Comstock Inv. Management
Corp., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,607 (C.F.T.C. May 11,
1978); LeBallister v. Lincolnwood Commodities, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,538 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 21, 1977). See generally In re Hardwick and
Wells Commodities, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,001
(C.F.T.C. Feb. 10, 1984); Amelin v. United States Inv. Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) i 21,948 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 27, 1983); Doran v. Yorkstone Research,
Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) % 21,932 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 9,
1983), petition for review denied, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
22,213 (C.F.T.C. May 15, 1984); Nesting v. Boston Trading Group, Inc., [1982-1984 Trans-
fer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,917 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 28, 1983).
87. Gary Oakland Enters. v. R.B. Thompson Assocs., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
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or simulated trading records are used improperly. 8 Imprudent in-
vestment decisions, however, do not give rise to liability under the
CEA,89 nor is it a violation for a broker to dissuade a customer
from making a trade that would have been profitable or to make
reasonable price predictions.9
As a means of countering misrepresentations and assuring that
customers are informed of the risks of trading, the CFTC has re-
quired a "Risk Disclosure Statement" be supplied to customers
before they trade. This document sets forth, in boldface type, the
specific types of risk that may be incurred in commodities trading.
For example, brokerage firms, referred to in the commodity futures
industry as "futures commission merchants," are required to pro-
vide a statement to customers containing the following language:
The risk of loss in trading commodity futures contracts can be substan-
tial. You should therefore carefully consider whether such trading is suitable
for you in light of your financial condition. In considering whether to trade,
COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) T 21,757 (C.F.T.C. June 17, 1983); Aurora Nova Corp. v. Domes-
tic Oil Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,634 (C.F.T.C.
Nov. 22, 1982); In re Citadel Trading Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) V 21,238 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 31, 1981); Beshara v. Spath, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,616 (C.F.T.C. May 25, 1978). See generally Shaver v. Ansell,
[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,044 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 1, 1984);
Laub v. Braverman, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. RaP. (CCH) 22,000
(C.F.T.C. Feb. 3, 1984); Adil v. Moorthy's Commodity Servs., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) I 21,973 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 26, 1984).
88. Kerr v. First Commodity Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) I 22,119 (8th Cir. May 9, 1984); Cox v. Eastern Capital Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder]; COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) T 22,009 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 16, 1984); Ward v. Stanford
Management Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) I 21,979
(C.F.T.C. Jan. 27, 1984); Lehman v. Madda Trading Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder]
COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) I 21,117 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 11, 1980); Sztaba v. First Commodity
Corp., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. RaP. (CCH) 20,789 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 12,
1979).
89. See Harcourt v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUr. L. REP. (CCH) I 21,619 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 1982); see also Van Alen v. Dominick & Domi-
nick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 560 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1977) (a mar-
ket "recommendation that goes awry does not make out a [fraud] claim" under the federal
securities laws).
90. See Bradley v. Clayton Brokerage Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L.
REP. (CCH) T 21,700 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 31, 1983); see also Biederman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. RaP. (CCH) I 22,104
(C.F.T.C. Apr. 26, 1984); Wohlers v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) I 22,101 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 26, 1984); Zadik v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L.
REP. (CCH) I 22,036 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 16, 1984); Kenny v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) I 21,924 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 10, 1983);
Kypriotakis v. International Precious Metals Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) I 21,893 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 21, 1983); Aslock v. Premex, Inc., [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. RaP. (CCH) I 21,602 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 8, 1982).
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you should be aware of the following:
(1) You may sustain a total loss of the initial margin funds and any addi-
tional funds that you deposit with your broker to establish or maintain a
position in the commodity futures market. If the market moves against your
position, you may be called upon by your broker to deposit a substantial
amount of additional marginal funds, on short notice, in order to maintain
your position ...
(5) The high degree of leverage that is often obtainable in futures trading
because of the small margin requirements can work against you as well as for
you. The use of leverage can lead to large losses as well as gains.9 1
Since the adoption of this provision, CFTC administrative law
judges have been reluctant to find that risks of trading have been
misrepresented to customers when the customer received a disclos-
ure document before trading. In Tapper v. Rosenthal & Co.,92 a
CFTC hearing officer stated: "The disclosure statement made it
abundantly clear, in bold-face type, that [complainant] could lose
her entire investment. I reject [her] testimony that she was never
told she could lose her investment."'93 Similarly, in Thompson v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,"' the administrative
law judge noted that the "[c]omplainant signed a risk disclosure
statement prior to any trades being made on the account, and that
statement informed him that losses may be substantial." Conse-
quently, complainant's contention that he would never have con-
sented to trades recommended by his account executive had he re-
alized the loss potential was rejected."" The CFTC also has
concluded that when a required risk disclosure statement is not
supplied, customers may not recover their trading losses if they are
otherwise informed of the risks.9" In a proceeding prior to the ef-
91. 17 C.F.R. § 1.55 (1984).
92. [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,400 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 5,
1982).
93. Id. at 25,915.
94. No. R 80-580-80-717 Slip Op. at 1 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 9, 1983).
95. Id. at 4. In Margolin v. First Commodity Corp., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) % 21,432 (C.F.T.C. June 10, 1982), a CFTC hearing officer held
that the CFTC had "sought to alert individuals to [the] danger [of trading commodity fu-
tures contracts] by establishing formal disclosure requirements which are designed to 'en-
lighten the prudent' and 'to discourage the foolhardy;'" therefore, the broker's "uninhibited
optimism should have been offset in the complainant's mind by the clear warning to pro-
spective customers set forth in the formal statement." Id. at 26,076 (footnotes omitted). The
CFTC, however, subsequently found the hearing officer's opinion in Margolin to be unper-
suasive. Id.; see also Rasheed v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,837 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 19, 1983).
96. Sher v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 2 COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 22,266
(C.F.T.C. June 13, 1984); see also Einhorn v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) T 22,100 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 20, 1984);
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fective date of the CFTC's risk disclosure statement requirements,
a CFTC hearing officer held that no misrepresentation would be
found, even though the broker had made assurances of "tremen-
dous profits and very limited risk, '97 because the broker had spe-
Blome v. R.G. Dickinson & Co. [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
21.916 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 18, 1983). But see Abeyta v. Bear, Stearns & Co., [1980-1982 Trans-
fer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,350 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 10, 1982); see also Harris v.
Davis H. Siegel, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,701
(C.F.T.C. Apr. 14, 1983); Mohr v. Gregory Commodity Options, Ltd., [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,688 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 24, 1983); O'Shyne v. New
Jersey Precious Metals, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) T 21,662
(C.F.T.C. Feb. 10, 1983); Al-Awar v. Rosenthal & Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FuT. L. REP. (CCH) % 21,680 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 27, 1982); Hardiman v. Nelson, Ghun & Assocs.
[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,619 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 30, 1982);
Shah v. David H. Siegel, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
% 21,485 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 28, 1982); Silverman v. Nelson, Ghun & Assocs. [ 1980-1982 Trans-
fer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) N 21,484 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 28, 1982); Sher v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,486
(C.F.T.C. Sept. 13, 1982); Meloche v. Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc., [1980-1982 Trans-
fer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) I 21,419 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 26, 1982); Polissar v. Nelson,
Ghun & Assocs., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,288 (C.F.T.C.
Aug. 5, 1981); O'Brien v. Williston Corp., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 21,180 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 24, 1981); Orr v. London Futures, Ltd., [1980-1982 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) % 21,155 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 23, 1981); Reed v. Lincolnwood
Communities, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) T 21,146
(C.F.T.C. Jan. 27, 1981). But cf. Blome v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,916 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 18, 1983); Kupser v. Chartered
Sys. Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,717 (C.F.T.C. May
6, 1983); DeCaro v. Rosenthal & Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) T 21,078 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 2, 1980); Greenberg v. Chartered Sys. Corp., [1980-1982
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) % 21,084 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 27, 1980).
97. Gorney v. Comvest, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
I 21,443, at 26,105 (C.F.T.C. June 24, 1982); see also Alter v. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc.,
No. R 81-925-82-370 (C.F.T.C. July 7, 1983) (liability of defendant for misrepresentation
overturned when a signed risk disclosure statement was offered with a motion for reconsid-
eration); Ramoudt v. International Trading Group, Ltd., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) I 21,737 (C.F.T.C. June 8, 1983) (customer's oral acknowledge-
ment that she had read the risk disclosure statement precluded a finding of misrepresenta-
tion); D'Antonio v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., No. R 80-1019-81-13 (C.F.T.C. Mar.
29, 1983) (signed risk disclosure statement demonstrates that complainants were adequately
informed of the risk); Szymanski v. Cleary Trading Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FuT. L. REP. (CCH) T 21,617, at 26,355 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 18, 1982) (complainant's allegations
of nondisclosure of risks unsubstantiated where the risks were set out in documents signed
by complainant); Thakarar v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) I 21,605, at 26,312-13 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 24, 1982)
(because complainant was provided with risk disclosure statement, claim that risk of a tax
straddle was not disclosed cannot be sustained); Hentschel v. Delphi Commodity, Inc.,
[1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) I 21,408, at 25,936 (C.F.T.C. June
15, 1982) ("The complainant's signature on the statement evidences that he was informed of
the risk and chose to invest in full awareness thereof," and therefore, "[ilt is not necessary
to resolve the question of who said what because the complainant received the written warn-
ing as to the risk of commodity futures trading and the danger of loss in such investment.");
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cifically warned the complainant in writing before the account was
opened that there was a high risk of loss trading commodity fu-
tures. Similarly, another CFTC decision indicates that any broker
misrepresentations are cured through delivery of the disclosure
statement. 9 In other decisions the CFTC has stated, however, that
written disclosure statements will not provide immunity where oral
misrepresentations are made that overcome the written
disclosure.99
Koski v. Rosenthal & Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,207,
at 24,975 (C.F.T.C. May 29, 1981) (broker provided customer with risk disclosure statement,
and therefore no misrepresentation of risks was found). See generally Zobrist v. Coal-X,
Inc., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,163 (10th Cir. May 11, 1983)
(knowledge of contents of risk disclosures in a private placement memorandum are imputed
to a securities customer even though he did not read the memorandum and even though the
broker falsely stated that there were no risks); Kats v. Merrill Lynch Commodites, Inc.,
[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) V 21,998 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 3, 1984)
(futures commission merchant did not violate CEA when customer was informed of the risks
as evidenced by the customer's signing three different risk disclosure statements); ACLI
Int'l Commodity Servs., Inc. v. Lindwall, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 22,115 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1984) (no fraud when customer executed a risk
disclosure statement); cf. Hardill v. Williams, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,220
(C.F.T.C. May 31, 1984) (agent of futures commission merchant violated the CEA when he
failed to disclose accurately the "option period").
98. Schwarz v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., No. 82-239 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 14, 1983)
(any misrepresentation was cured by furnishing risk disclosure documents).
99. See Rasheed v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,837 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 19, 1983); see also Wegerer v. First Commodity
Corp., 2 COMM. PUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,348 (10th Cir. Sept. 10, 1984); Gonzales v. National
Monetary Fund, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUr. L. REP. (CCH) 22,124
(C.F.T.C. May 10, 1984); Ward v. Stanford Management Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. PUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,979 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 27, 1984); Schmigel v. Kamin, [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] COMM. PUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,954 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 4, 1984); Newman v.
Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
1 21,811 (C.F.T.C. July 19, 1983); Swiers v. Rosenthal & Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) t 21,817 (C.F.T.C. May 27, 1983); Sturcken v. Clayton Brokerage
Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fr. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,727 (C.F.T.C. May 10,
1983); Notkin v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) T 21,236 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 25, 1981); Walker v. Rosenthal & Co., [1980-
1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. PUT. L. REP. (CCH) % 21,168 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 25, 1981);
Chicoine v. Rosenthal & Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. PUT. L. REP. (CCH)
1 21,075 (C.F.T.C. July 2, 1980).
In Gittemeier v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) T 21,929 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 30, 1983) an administrative law judge
held that a CFTC risk disclosure statement was not a sufficient disclosure of the risks that
could be incurred in a thin, infrequently traded contract market. Cf. Applegate v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. PUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,881
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 1983) (the district court held that a broker's claim of limited loss poten-
tial was contravened by the risk disclosure document signed by the customer); see also Far-
rell v. Money Int'l, Ltd., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,891
(C.F.T.C. Oct. 31, 1983).
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C. Churning
Churning0 " is a form of cheating and defrauding and thus is a
violation of section 4b(A) of the CEA.1'0 Whether the volume of
trading in a commodities account constitutes churning is depen-
dent upon a consideration of the facts surrounding the transac-
tions in that account.10 2 Churning as a violation of the securities
laws has been well documented in case law. 03 Two major elements
must be present to establish churning in a securities account: (1)
broker control over trading in the customer's account, and (2)
trading that is excessive both in frequency and in volume in light
of the customer's trading objective.1
0 4
Recognizing that motive and opportunity for churning in both
commodities and securities are similar, 105 the CFTC, nonetheless,
100. Churning consists of excessive trading by a broker of a customer's account to
generate brokerage commissions rather than to benefit the customer. See 17 C.F.R.
240.15ci-7(a) (1984) (interpreting churning in the context of § 15(c)(1) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934).
101. See LaQuaglia v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT.
L. REP. (CCH) 21,392, at 25,888 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 12, 1982); In re Cayman Assocs., [1980-
1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,277, at 25,367 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 23,
1981).
102. In Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on
other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970) the court stated:
Churning cannot be and need not be, established by any one precise rule or formula.
The essential question of fact for determination is whether the volume and frequency
of transactions, considered in the light of the nature of the account and the situation,
needs and objectives of the customer, have been so "excessive" as to indicate a purpose
of the broker to derive profit for himself while disregarding the interests of the
customer.
Id. at 435.
103. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 809 n.18 (1983).
104. Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1982); Mihara v. Dean
Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980); Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F.
Supp. 1021, 1039-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); see also McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
Inc., 598 F.2d 888, 890 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057,
1069-70 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 258
(4th Cir. 1975); Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 368 n.1 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1206-07 (9th
Cir. 1970); Hudson, Customer Protection in the Commodity Futures Market, 58 B.U.L.R. 1,
18 (1978).
105. The CFTC stated that:
(i) [C]ustomers trade through professionals whose remuneration usually depends on
the volume of transactions in the customer's account, (ii) there is a temptation for the
professional to cause an excessive number of transactions in order "to derive profit for
himself while disregarding the interests of the customer," and (iii) the professional
often occupies the dual role of advisor to the customer and agent for effecting trades.
Proposed Standards of Conduct, supra note 57, at 44,746 (footnote omitted).
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has distinguished churning in a commodities account from churn-
ing in a securities account. Particularly, the Commission has re-
jected" 6 the use of the "turnover rate"'107 as a statistical gauge for
determining whether churning has occurred in the securities area.
The CFTC stated that the "turnover rate", as applied in securities
cases, is "inherently inappropriate for determining whether exces-
sive trading has been established in futures churning cases."108 A
basic premise of securities trading is that once a securities profes-
sional acquires securities for a controlled account, the acquisition
normally is followed by a holding period so the professional may
determine whether his assessment of the securities' growth poten-
tial was accurate. Commodities futures contracts, however, are
short term instruments that have a faster inherent "turnover rate"
because of short expiration dates and the volatility of commodity
prices. The CFTC concluded, therefore, that the length of time a
futures contract is held is not "particularly revealing in determin-
ing whether a commodities account has been traded exces-
sively."' 0 9 Furthermore, the CFTC noted that the turnover rate's
focus on the total cost of securities purchased over a period of time
is inapplicable in commodities cases because a futures contract is
executory in nature and the overwhelming majority of commodity
customers trade futures contracts without any intention of making
or taking delivery of the underlying commodity. Given this situa-
tion, the CFTC concluded that it would be inaccurate to consider
the total dollar value of the commodity futures contracts pur-
chased in the same manner as the "turnover rate" is considered in
a securities account." 0
In 1977 the CFTC proposed a regulation outlining the stan-
dards of conduct for commodity trading professionals."' The pro-
posed standards contained a provision that expressly prohibited
106. See In re Lincolnwood Commodities, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,986 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 31, 1984).
107. The turnover rate is defined as "'the relationship between the cost of purchases
and the average investment, the latter representing the cumulative total of the net invest-
ment in the account at the end of each month, exclusive of loans, divided by the number of
calendar months under consideration.'" Id. at 28,246 n.76 (quoting In re R. H. Johnson &
Co., 36 S.E.C. 467, 471 n.4 (1955), aff'd, 231 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844
(1956)).
108. In re Lincolnwood Commodities, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,986, at 28,247 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 31, 1984).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Proposed Standards of Conduct, supra note 57.
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the churning of commodities accounts. 112 The CFTC emphasized
that this provision only made explicit what was implicitly required
of commodity trading professionals under the various antifraud
provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act and the CFTC's rules:
that the churning of a customer's commodity futures account is a
clear violation of section 4b of the CEA.1 3
The CFTC has noted that, although no precise guidelines can
be drawn as to when churning occurs and each situation must be
judged on its own facts," 4 the principal elements of the churning
offense are: control of the account by the professional and exces-
sive trading.1 5 Control of an account is defined as the express au-
thorization to the professional by the customer to trade or exercise
"control in fact" over the account even though no grant of discre-
tion has been made." 6 The CFTC outlined control in fact as
112. Proposed § 166.3 stated:
No Commision registrant, or representative thereof, who is vested with discretion-
ary power or authority over a customer's account, or otherwise controls the account,
may, directly or indirectly, effect for that account transactions in any commodity inter-
est that are excessive in size or frequency in light of the nature of (a) the account and
(b) the commodity interest involved.
Id. at 44,750. The CFTC noted that proposed § 166.3 was similar to rule 15cl-7(a) of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Id. at 44,745; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7(a) (1984).
113. Proposed Standards of Conduct, supra note 57, at 44,743 (footnote omitted).
114. The CFTC listed certain factors that could be relevant in particular situations,
with a caveat that such factors were not an exhaustive list:
(i) The turn-over rate. This is the ratio of the total cost of purchases made for the
account during a given period of time to the average month-end net equity in the ac-
count during the period. The amount of permissible turn-over will depend upon such
factors as market conditions, the commodity interest [sic].
(ii) The nature of the account. As indicated in (i) above, the stated objective of
the customer is an important factor. A turn-over rate that is acceptable in the account
of an individual who wishes to trade especially actively may be unacceptable in the
account of an average trader.
(iii) "In-and-out" trading. Since the establishment of market positions for periods
of less than a day (such trades are commonly known as "day trades" or "in-and-out
trades") can generate substantial commission revenues, this type of trading-although
clearly not inherently improper-could be a factor in determining whether an account
has been churned.
(iv) Ration [sic] of commissions to net equity. The ration [sic] of the commissions
generated by the account during a particular period to the average, month-end net
equity in the account during the period is also a significant factor, particularly when it
can be compared to the commission-equity ratio in other similar accounts maintained
with the commodity professional.
Id. at 44,745. As noted supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text, the CFTC subsequently
rejected the use of turnover rates in commodity futures churning analyses. See In re Lin-
colnwood Commodities, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
T 21,986 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 31, 1984).
115. Proposed Standards of Conduct, supra note 57, at 44,745 (footnote omitted).
116. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417,433 (N.D. Cal. 1968). If a broker
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existing:
[W]here the professional-by reason of the trust and confidence placed in
him by the customer, the customer's lack of sophistication in commodity
trading, or some combination of these factors-significantly influences the
trading in the account. The mere fact that the customer occasionally initiates
his own trades or rejects the professional's advice would not preclude the ex-
istence of factual control, nor would the customer's sophistication in com-
modity trading.""
In 1978 the CFTC decided not to adopt the proposed churning
rule on the basis of two factors. First, the CFTC believed the
churning rule would merely codify principles that are implicit in
the antifraud provisions of the CEA. Second, the Commission be-
lieved that "the benefits to be gained from codification [were] out-
weighed by the risk of unintentionally narrowing the scope of these
provisions. ' 118
As noted, an essential element in a churning claim is "broker
control" over the commodities account. It is not necessary, how-
ever, for the account to be discretionary before churning can be
found. Courts have found "broker control" in both discretionary
and nondiscretionary accounts.119 In the leading pronouncement of
the CFTC on broker control, Smith v. Siegel Trading Co.,120 the
CFTC enunciated six factors that, although not exhaustive, were
typified as "well recognized factors ...probative of control and
which at a minimum should be considered by the trier of fact" in
determining whether churning has taken place:
1) a lack of customer sophistication
2) a lack of prior commodity trading experience on the part of the customer
and a minimum of time devoted by him to his account
3) a high degree of trust and confidence reposed in the associated person by
the customer
overtrades a commodities account without having express or implied control over trading
decisions, he is trading without customer authorization, not churning the account. See Hud-
son, supra note 104, at 20; supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text; infra notes 117-30.
117. Proposed Standards of Conduct, supra note 57, at 44,745 (footnote omitted).
118. See Adoption of Customer Protection Rules, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,886 (1978); see also
Peloso, Churning a Commodity Futures Account, NEW YORK L.J. at 2, col. 2 (Sept. 23,
1982).
119. As one court noted:
Although control by the representative over the account is essential to a finding of
churning, such control need not amount to a formal vesting of discretion in that repre-
sentative. A degree of control sufficient to warrant protection may be inferred from
evidence that the customer invariably relied on the dealer's recommendations, espe-
cially when the customer is relatively naive and unsophisticated.
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
120. [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REiP. (CCH) 1 21,105 (C.F.T.C. Sept.
3, 1980).
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4) a large percentage of transactions entered into by the customer based upon
the recommendations of the associated person
5) the absence of prior customer approval for transactions entered into on his
behalf
6) customer approval of recommended transactions where the approval is not
based upon full, truthful and accurate information supplied by the associated
person. 2 '
Churning cases concerning nondiscretionary commodities accounts
have hinged on a determination of whether the plaintiff had the
capacity to determine his overall position or the total amount of
real profit or loss occurring in his account. 2' The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently held that "[tihe touchstone [for deter-
mining broker control] is whether or not the customer has suffi-
cient intelligence and understanding to evaluate the broker's rec-
ommendations and to reject one when he thinks it unsuitable" and
"[a]s long as the customer has the capacity to exercise the final
right to say 'yes' or 'no', [sic] the customer controls the
account."'12 3
The judiciary and the CFTC have been loathe to adopt a pre-
cise empirical formula to determine when churning occurs in a
commodities account. A court, however, invariably will review the
length of the time period during which trading occurred, the
amount lost by the customer, and the commissions earned by the
121. Id. at 24,454 & n.6; see also Friedman v. Dean Witter & Co., [1980-1982 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,307 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 13, 1981); In re Luizzi, [1982-
1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,833 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 27, 1981).
122. In Hecht v. Harris Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), the court
stated that a customer must be "sufficiently skilled" to be able to supervise his account. Id.
at 434. The court held that "plaintiff's comprehension of the securities market was defi-
nitely limited, her comprehension of the commodities market was virtually nil and her com-
prehension of both was most superficial." Id. at 433.
In Knieriemen v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,363 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 1982), a state court upheld a
finding of churning in a nondiscretionary account. Knieriemen, an unemployed merchant
seaman who had once been employed as a stockbroker, invested approximately $100,000
from the proceeds of an insurance policy in a commodities account. The broker testified
that he obtained Kneieriemen's consent before each trade in meetings at various bars.
Knieriemen testified to a severe alcohol abuse problem and that he was intoxicated on
"nearly every occasion" that he spoke to his broker. Id. at 25,709. The court stated:
Even though the plaintiff's account was a non-discretionary one, the plaintiff ade-
quately showed that the [broker] exercised control over trading in the account due to
the plaintiff's continuous intoxication and that the plaintiff relied totally on the advice
of [the broker] for the same reason.
Id. at 25,710. The Knieriemen court also found that churning does not require the same
level of intent generally required for common-law fraud-noting that the broker had abused
the plaintiff's confidence and trust in order to create commissions. Id.
123. Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1982).
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broker. For example, churning was found when a broker engaged
in over 500 transactions and generated $23,522.87 in commissions
in a period of approximately eighteen months. 24 Churning also
was found when the commissions of a broker equalled seventy-two
percent of the amount deposited for a commodities account during
a nine-week period in which the account was depleted from $2500
to $2.125 A CFTC hearing officer has emphasized that "[a] very im-
portant factor in determining churning is the ratio of the size of
the professional's profit in relation to the size of the customer's
initial investment."' 26 A 67.1% commission equity ratio and a 57 %
commission trading ratio were found to compel a finding of churn-
ing. 127 One administrative law judge has even stated "the entry of a
single trade that is not for the benefit of the customer shall always
be considered as churning.'
12 s
124. See Knieriemen v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer
Binder] COMM. PUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,363 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 1982).
125. See Martin v. Cayman Assocs., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 21,406, at 25,932 (C.F.T.C. May 26, 1982).
In Aronson v. Cayman Assocs., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
T 21,268 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 5, 1981), a CFTC hearing officer found that the account in question
had been churned when the opening balance of $3500 had been depleted in two weeks by
continuous day trading with the brokers receiving commissions totalling $3415. The hearing
officer noted "[c]onsuming almost 100% of the principal investment in the form of commis-
sion income during only two weeks of trading is the type of statistic which by itself suggests
that the account was being managed for the benefit of the brokers rather than that of the
customer." Id. at 25,325.
126. Martin v. Cayman Assocs., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 21,406, at 25,932 (C.F.T.C. May 26, 1982).
127. Cox v. Eastern Capital Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 22,009, at 28,543 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 16, 1984). The CFTC hearing officer also noted
other factors that were indicative of churning, namely: same day trading in a managed ac-
count (44 day trades in a six week period for the account in question) along with the ab-
sence of a legitimate trading strategy as demonstrated by the substantial open market posi-
tion in T-Bonds and the liquidation and reestablishment of similar positions created a
strong presumption of churning. Id. at 28,542-43.
128. Quigley v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT.
L. REP. (CCH) q 21,330, at 25,597 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 22, 1982). A CFTC hearing officer in In re
Cayman Assocs., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,277 (C.F.T.C.
Oct. 23, 1981), found that, in a situation in which accounts were drained of equity with
customers paying from 74% to 173% in commissions, the record of trading "amply satisfies
the statistical measures for churning." Id. at 25,367; see also Schmigel v. Kamin, [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,954 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 4, 1984); Cenizal v.
Brown & Assocs., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,938
(C.F.T.C. Dec. 7, 1983). A district court in International Cattle Sys. v. Parsons, [1980-1982
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,367 (D. Kan. Mar. 9, 1982), however,
found that churning did not occur when customers specifically authorized each transaction
and paid commissions of less than four percent of the absolute value of their trading profits
and losses. Id. at 25,756; see also Greeley v. Lincolnwood Commodities Inc., [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,834 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 17, 1983); Tolliver v.
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The CFTC, relying on Siegel Trading,'29 rejected an adminis-
trative law judge's conclusion that, as a general rule, churning may
be found whenever trading in a controlled account generates com-
missions of fifty percent of a customer's investment over a period
of six months or less. 130 The CFTC stated that the determination
that trading was excessive can be made only after analyzing the
specific objectives of the account.' 3 ' The CFTC affirmed its belief
that a finding of churning includes several factors, and the interre-
lationship between these factors should be carefully considered by
the trier of fact in the context of each case.13 2
Murlas Commodities, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,752
(C.F.T.C. June 16, 1983); Vaneck v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,697 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 30, 1983); cf. Piskur v. Interna-
tional Precious Metals Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
21,664 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 4, 1982) (leverage transactions). For a discussion of damage claims
for churning violations, see McGinn v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2 COMM.
FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,242 (8th Cir. June 22, 1984). See generally Hogstrom v. Brentman,
572 F. Supp. 692 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Doubet v. Peavey and Co., 2 COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
1 22,219 (C.F.T.C. June 4, 1984); Moore v. Andre Boesch Corp., 2 COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 22,204 (C.F.T.C. May 25, 1984); Gonzales v. National Monetary Fund, Inc., [1982-
1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) T22,124 (C.F.T.C. May 10, 1984); Clayton
v. Ace Am., Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,120 (C.F.T.C.
May 8, 1984); Trust & Inv. AG v. Stotler & Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L.
REP. (CCH) 22,122 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 26, 1984); Wohlers v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,101 (C.F.T.C. Apr.
26, 1984); McGowan v. Cinna, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
22,086 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 11, 1984); Berendt v. Strategic Fin. Servs., [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 22,077 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 9, 1984); Skinner v. Eastern
Capital Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,055 (C.F.T.C.
Mar. 20), dismissed, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,107
(C.F.T.C. Apr. 26, 1984); Marcus v. Murlas Commodities, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,041 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 15, 1984); Boissonneau v. Dameron,
Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,016 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 22,
1984); Zadik v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,036 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 16, 1984); Cox v. Eastern Capital Corp.,
[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,009 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 16, 1984);
In re Cayman Assocs., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,999
(C.F.T.C. Feb. 10), vacated and remanded on other grounds, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,097 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 11, 1984); Cooper v. Conticommodity
Servs, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,996 (C.F.T.C. Feb.
3, 1984); Schnigel v. Kamin, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
V 21,954 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 4, 1984); Centzal v. Brown & Assocs., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,938 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 7, 1983); Nesting v. Boston Trading
Group, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,917 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 28,
1983).
129. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
130. In re Auster, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,274, at
25,343 n.4 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 4, 1981).
131. Id.
132. Id. For decisions concerning the appropriate measure of damages in churning
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D. Unauthorized Trading
A trade in a nondiscretionary account without the customer's
consent constitutes unauthorized trading. Unauthorized trading is
a violation of section 4b of the CEA and CFTC Regulation 166.2.11
This rule, prompted by frequent customer complaints of unautho-
rized trading by futures commission merchants,3 prohibits future
commission merchants, or associates from effecting transactions in
nondiscretionary accounts unless the customer specifically autho-
rizes the transaction and identifies the particular commodity and
exact amount eligible for purchase or sale. 135 Upon adoption of the
rule, the CFTC announced that because unauthorized trading had
been held a violation of section 4b of the CEA, adopting the spe-
cific rule would have no substantive effect on existing law.
136
The factual analysis of unauthorized trading cases includes a
consideration of whether a confirmation was sent to the cus-
tomer, 137 whether the customer objected to the confirmation,
138
cases, compare McGinn v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2 COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) T 22,242 (8th Cir. June 22, 1984) with Lehman v. Madda Trading Co., CFTC
Civ. No. R. 78-3-78-135 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 18, 1984) and Huff v. First Fin. Corp., 2 COMM. FUT.
L. REP. (CCH) 5 22,272 (C.F.T.C. June 28, 1984); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. McKeehan, 570 S.W.2d 654 (Ct. App. Ky. 1978).
133. 17 C.F.R. § 166.2 (1984).
134. Proposed Standards of Conduct, supra note 57, at 44,746. The CFTC stated that
complaints most commonly related to the following:
(1) disputes as to whether a trade was in accordance with the customers' instructions as
to price, quantity, etc.; (2) disputes as to whether a trade was authorized at all; and (3)
disputes as to whether the customer had granted the [futures commission merchant] or
other person discretionary authority to trade for his account.
Id.
135. Id. at 44,742. CFTC Regulation 166.2 "Authorization to Trade" states:
No futures commission merchant, introducing broker or any of their associated persons
may directly or indirectly effect a transaction in a commodity interest for the account of any
customer unless before the transaction the customer, or person designated by the customer
to control the account:
(a) Specifically authorized the futures commission merchant, introducing broker or
any of their associated persons to effect the transaction (a transaction is "specifically
authorized" if the customer or person designated by the customer to control the ac-
count specifies (1) the precise commodity interest to be purchased or sold and (2) the
exact amount of the commodity interest to be purchased or sold); or
(b) Authorized in writing the futures commission merchant, introducing broker or
any of their associated persons to effect transactions in commodity interests for the
account without the customer's specific authorization.
17 C.F.R. § 166.2 (1984).
136. Adoption of Customer Protection Rules, supra note 57, at 31,886, 31,888 & n.3.
137. Raskin v. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT.
L. REP. (CCH) q 21,459 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1982); Bowen Supply, Inc. v. Ketchum, 2 COMM.
FUT L. REP. (CCH) 22,237 (C.F.T.C. June 19, 1984); Frymier v. Murlas Commodities, Inc.,
[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,043 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 9, 1984);
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whether the customer ratified the unauthorized transaction, 39
Hamann v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 22,028 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 2, 1984); Rabstein v. Thompson-McKinnon Sec., Inc., [1982-
1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) i 22,017 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 27, 1984); Baker
v. Stotler & Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,994 (C.F.T.C.
Jan. 31, 1984); AI-Awar v. Rosenthal & Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L.
REP. (CCH) 21,430 (C.F.T.C. May 17, 1982); Bunzel v. Clayton Brokerage Co., [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,080 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 30, 1980); Knall, Inc.
v. Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) T 20,883 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 20, 1979); Siebenthaler v. First Dover Commodities, Ltd.,
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,707 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 14, 1978);
Keehner v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 365 N.E.2d 275 (Ill. App. 1977); Brown v. Pressner Trading
Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) T 22,136 (N.Y. City Sup. Ct.
May 15, 1984).
138. Raskin v. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT.
L. REP. (CCH) 21,459 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1982); Stoller v. Siegel Trading Co., 2 COMM.
FuTr. L. REP. (CCH) 1 22,224 (C.F.T.C. June 6, 1984); Manoyian v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2 COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,223 (C.F.T.C. May 31, 1984); In re
Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
22,106 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 27, 1984); Walton v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,078 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 9, 1984); Dealers Lift Truck
Supply, Corp. v. Farmers Grain & Livestock Hedging Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) T 22,066 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 30, 1984); Rahal v. Paris Sec. Corp.,
[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,065 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 30, 1984);
Goetze v. Chartered Sys. Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
22,058 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 29, 1984); Meridian Brick v. Murlas Commodities, [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) % 22,042 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 8, 1984); Rabstein v.
Thomson-McKinnon Sec., Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
1 22,017 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 27, 1984); Cowen v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,037 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 23, 1984);
Baker v. Stotler & Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,994
(C.F.T.C. Jan. 31, 1984); In re Lincolnwood Commodities, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) q 21,986 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 31, 1984); Al-Awar v. Rosenthal & Co.,
[1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) T 21,430 (C.F.T.C. May 17, 1982);
Siebenthaler v. First Dover Commodities, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L.
REP. (CCH) T 20,707 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 17, 1978); Schang v. London Futures, Ltd., [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,613 (C.F.T.C. May 22, 1978).
For example, in Kats v. Cayman Assocs., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 21,205 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 10, 1981), the CFTC hearing officer found unauthorized
trading to be present in an account of Kats, an Iowa farmer who demonstrated that his
commodities trading account with Cayman Associates, Ltd. was solely for the purpose of
hedging in connection with his feeder cattle business and no authorization had been given
for speculative trades in pork bellies. When Kate received a confirmation that indicated
trades had been placed in pork bellies, he called his broker to object and followed up the
telephone call with a written complaint in accordance with the customer agreement that he
had signed. The hearing officer awarded Kats the amount of the net loss on the unautho-
rized trades and the amount of commission charges plus interest.
139. Master Commodities, Inc. v. Texas Cattle Management Co., 586 F.2d 1352 (10th
Cir. 1978); Lincoln Commodity Servs. v. Meade, 558 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1977); Herman v. T.
& S. Commodities, Inc., 2 COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) I 22,250 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1984);
Raskin v. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) I 21,459 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1982); Blome v. R. G. Dickinson & Co., [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. 21,916 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 18, 1984); Manoyian v. Mer-
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whether the transaction fell within the scope of the authoriza-
tion,140 whether the transaction was the result of a mistake,' 4 ' and
whether the failure to disclose risk precludes a holding of true au-
thorization. 142 The preeminent case concerning ratification of un-
authorized transactions is Sherwood v. Madda Trading Co.,' 43 in
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2 COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,223 (C.F.T.C.
May 31, 1984); Beer v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 9 21,729 (C.F.T.C. May 17, 1984); Wohlers v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 22,101 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 26, 1984); Walton v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,078 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 9, 1984); Mills v.
Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 9 22,082 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 5, 1984); Dealers Lift Truck Supply Corp. v. Farmers Grain
& Livestock Hedging Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
9 22,066 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 30, 1984); Rahal v. Paris Sec. Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) q 22,065 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 30, 1984); Meridian Brick v. Murlas
Commodities, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUr. L. REP. (CCH) 22,042
(C.F.T.C. Mar. 8, 1984); Rabstein v. Thomson-McKinnon Sec., Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FUT. L. RaP. (CCH) 22,017 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 27, 1984); Cowen v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 9 22,037 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 23, 1984); Baker v. Stotler & Co., [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 9 21,994 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 31, 1984); Blome v. R.G. Dickin-
son & Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] (CCH) 9 21,916 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 18, 1983); Mendoza
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 21,918 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 14, 1983); Bradley v. Clayton Brokerage, Co. [1982-
1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) % 21,700 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 31, 1983); Rob-
erts v. Lincolnwood Commodities, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 9 21,699 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 4, 1983); Harcourt v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., [1982-
1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. RaP. (CCH) % 21,619 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 4, 1982); Cald-
well v. Miller-Jesser, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) V 21,614
(C.F.T.C. Oct. 14, 1982); Millman v. International Precious Metals Corp., [1982-1984 Trans-
fer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 9 21,663 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 27, 1982); Guttman v. Paine
Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
1 21,434 (C.F.T.C. June 18, 1982); A1-Awar v. Rosenthal & Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 9 21,430 (C.F.T.C. May 17, 1982); Watters v. Thomson-McKin-
non Sec., Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 9 21,240 (C.F.T.C.
Sept. 11, 1981); Bunzel v. Clayton Brokerage Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT.
L. REP. (CCH) 22,080 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 30, 1980); Strite v. British Am. Commodity Options
Corp., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 9 20,903 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 21,
1979); Sieberthaler v. First Dover Commodities, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FuT. L. RaP. (CCH) V 20,707 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 14, 1978).
140. .Crump v. A.G. Edwards and Sons, Inc., 2 COMM. FuT. L. RaP. (CCH) N 22,232
(C.F.T.C. June 5, 1984); Snazuk v. Murlas Commodities, Inc., 2 COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
9 22,205 (C.F.T.C. May 29, 1984).
141. Gittemeier v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. RaP. (CCH) 21,929 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 30, 1983).
142. In re Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT.
L. REP. (CCH) 9 22,106 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 27, 1984); Mendoza v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. % 21,918 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 14,
1983).
143. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,728 (C.F.T.C. Jan.
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which the CFTC clarified the interrelated rights and duties that
arise when a customer believes that unauthorized trades have been
made in his account.""' The complicated set of facts presented in
Sherwood concerned several unauthorized trades in the plaintiff's
commodity account made by a broker in the defendant's firm. The
CFTC emphasized that a customer has an absolute right not to be
liable for any trade not authorized by him. If an unauthorized
trade occurs, the liability attaches to the futures commission
merchant, not the customer. 145 The CFTC also emphasized that a
futures commission merchant has a duty to inform the customer
that he must complain about unauthorized trades.1 46 The defen-
dant's customer information statement contained the following no-
tice: "Note: Please Report Any Differences Immediately."1 4 7 The
CFTC found that this "meager" statement imposed a duty upon
the plaintiff to notify his original broker or the defendant broker-
age firm of the errors, but advised that a more comprehensive
statement would have been appropriate.148 The CFTC found that
the plaintiff had partially satisfied this duty through his daily at-
5, 1979).
144. Id. at 23,017.
145. Id. at 23,018.
146. The CFTC stated:
[T]he futures commission merchant also must either inform the customer, or be de-
monstrably certain that the customer otherwise understands, that the customer's under
a duty to make a complaint at the first reasonable opportunity should he discover un-
authorized trading in his account. Any notification should be clear and unequivocal,
assuring that the customer understands the import of his action or inaction. If the
futures commission merchant fails to insure that its customer is on notice of this duty,
the futures commission merchant must necessarily assume absolute liability for all
trades ultimately found to have been executed without authorization. This notification
in turn triggers the duty of the customer to complain or attempt to complain to his
futures commission merchant immediately upon discovery of unauthorized trading.
Should a customer, who has been informed that he must make a timely complaint of
unauthorized trades, fail to notify or to attempt to notify the futures commission
merchant of unauthorized transactions, the customer will have breached his duty to the
futures commission merchant and thus must absorb himself any aggravated losses re-
sulting from subsequent liquidation of the unauthorized positions ....
Id. at 23,018-19 (footnotes omitted).
147. Id. at 23,019.
148. The CFTC stated:
It would have been better had Sherwood also been informed of his right to have unau-
thorized trades removed from his account upon timely and substantial complaint. This
would have assured Sherwood's understanding of the consequence of his failure to ob-
ject to the unauthorized trades. We wish to emphasize that a clear explanation to the
customer of his rights and duties inures to the benefit of both the customer and the
futures commission merchant.
Id. at 23,019 n.16.
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tempts 4 ' to contact his original broker. The CFTC also held that
the defendant's statement was "sufficiently ambiguous" so that the
plaintiff should not have been expected to know that his failure to
complain in timely fashion constituted permanent adoption of the
unauthorized trades and, therefore, was insufficient to demonstrate
ratification by the plaintiff.150 The CFTC recognized that notifica-
tions indicating a customer duty to inform the responsible officer
or agent of the futures commission merchant that an error has oc-
curred, such as those found in customer agreements, trade confir-
mations and account statements, raise a presumption of under-
standing on the part of a customer. However, this presumption can
be dispelled or rebutted if a customer can demonstrate that his
broker's subsequent conduct obscured the customer's understand-
ing of his rights and duties.'
5 '
The CFTC in Sherwood discussed the timing of notice of error
stating that "instant repudiation by the customer is not absolutely
necessary in order to dispel claims of ratification.' ' 52 The CFTC
further stated that:
The fact that a customer and account executive either by explicit or implicit
agreement await short-term market action which might cure any loss occur-
ring as the result of unauthorized activity prior to actually fixing financial
responsibility for the transaction in question does not, by itself, constitute
ratification or affirmative adoption of a trade. Rather, it is more of a coopera-
tive attempt to mitigate - and hopefully, eliminate - losses incurred in
hopes that the ultimate question of responsibility might never need to be
reached. However, absent some understanding between the parties, the cus-
tomer risks being estopped from recovering a full measure of damages should
his delay in protesting result in aggravated losses. . . . Indeed, should the
delay be of an unreasonable length, a factfinder might be free to conclude, in
conjunction with other circumstances, that the customer did actually intend
by his silence to adopt unauthorized trades as his own, regardless of subse-
quent market actions. 1' 3
In cases decided after Sherwood, the CFTC continued to opt
for the more "ad hoc and flexible principles of equitable estop-
pel"'154 when approaching a ratification question arising from unau-
149. The original broker instructed the plaintiff to call him person-to-person collect
whenever the plaintiff wished to contact him. After refusing the call, plaintiff would return
the call via the firm's WATS line. Id. at 23,017 n.8. The plaintiff called the broker daily
upon discovery of the unauthorized trades. The broker returned only one telephone call,
which the plaintiff was not available to answer. Id. at 23,019.
150. Id. at 23,020.
151. Id. at 23,018 n.14.
152. Id. at 23,020 n.20.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 23,022.
The CFTC stated:
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thorized trading.155
E. Other Customer Claims Under the CEA
Customer claims may be brought under sections of the CEA
other than section 4b. For example, section 4 of the CEA156 prohib-
its commodity futures contracts from being sold unless through a
member of a contract market registered with the CFTC and such
transactions must be effected on that exchange. The CFTC has
brought numerous actions charging that various forms of "off-ex-
change" contracts were actually futures contracts and were re-
We will not permit a commission merchant to assert that a customer has ratified a
trade made without customer authorization, such trade being patently fraudulent and
illegal, absent a clear and unequivocal adoption of such a trade by the customer. How-
ever, neither will we permit recovery of damages where unfair conduct by a customer
harms the financial interests of the broker. In sum, we wish to assure that all receive
fair treatment in the marketplace.
155. In Anderholt v. Rosenthal & Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 21,218 (C.F.T.C. June 26, 1981), a CFTC administrative law judge found that
certain unauthorized trades were ratified and certain others were not. The determining con-
sideration in Anderholt was whether the broker obscured the customer's understanding as
to the nature of commodities trades. The administrative law judge found that the customers
ratified certain unauthorized trades because they should have understood the text of the
confirmations that were sent to them and objected to the unauthorized trades. The
Anderholt judge stated:
I find complainant's testimony believable. . . . However, under [Sherwood v. Madda
Trading Co.] they are nevertheless bound by the statements, and must themselves "ab-
sorb" the losses resulting from the discrepancies. [Complainants] were not experienced
commodity or stock traders, but they obviously are above average in business sophisti-
cation and capable of reading such statements. There is no claim that respondent ob-
scured their understanding of the statements or misled them as to their meaning. It is,
therefore, found that the unauthorized purchases of March options were ratified by
complainants.
Id. at 25,076; see also Kochman v. Interest Rate Analysis, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,890 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 21, 1983); Apel v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,
[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,782 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 31, 1982).
In Brown v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 640 P.2d 453 (Mont. 1982),
the court upheld a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant brokerage firm
following allegations that the firm both improperly had withdrawn funds from plaintiffs'
ready asset account to cover margin calls in their commodity account and improperly liqui-
dated certain securities to cover a deficiency balance in another of plaintiffs' accounts. The
commodity customer agreement contained the following provisions: (1) any securities or
commodities carried in any of the customers' accounts are held as security by the broker for
any liability of the customers; (2) the broker had the discretion to liquidate accounts to
protect itself; and (3) the broker was authorized to transfer funds of the customers among
accounts. The court in Brown found that this agreement was an adequate authorization to
permit broker liquidation of a commodities account. Id. at 459; see also Greeley v. Lincoln-
wood Commodities, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) V 21,834
(C.F.T.C. Aug. 17, 1983); Parver v. Patton, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 21,454 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 4, 1982).
156. 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1982).
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quired to be traded on a contract market. 5 ' The CFTC has set
forth a detailed description of a futures contract that must be
traded on a contract market.158 Characteristics of such a contract
are, inter alia, standardization and the provision for future, rather
than present, delivery.' 59
Customers frequently assert that a futures commission
merchant either waited too long to liquidate futures contracts after
margin calls were not met and thereby failed to mitigate damages,
or that a futures commission merchant acted too quickly in liqui-
dating an account for failure to meet margin calls promptly. The
CFTC16 0 and the courts,' 61 however, have concluded that a futures
157. See, e.g., Co Petro Marketing Group, Inc. v. CFTC, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) q 21,421 (9th Cir. June 28, 1982); CFTC v. Co Petro Marketing
Group, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) T 21,420, at 26,013 (9th
Cir. June 25, 1982); CFTC v. National Coal Exch., Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,424, at 26,054-55 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 2, 1982); CFTC v. Commercial
Petrolera Internacional S.A., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
T 21,222 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1981); In re Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 21,941 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 6, 1979); see also, NRT Metals v. Manhattan Metals,
Ltd., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) q 21,931 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,
1983).
158. In re Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) q 20,941
(C.F.T.C. Dec. 6, 1979). Damages were awarded on the sale of futures contracts illegally sold
off an exchange in Kartheiser v. First Nat'l Monetary Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,831 (C.F.T.C. June 28, 1983), and in NRT Metals v.
Manhatten Metals, Ltd., 576 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Blalack v. First United States
Coal Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,235 (C.F.T.C. May
31, 1984); Jackson v. American Gold Dealers Assocs., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,956 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 9, 1983); cf. Abrams v. Oppenheimer Gov't Sec.,
Inc., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,214 (7th Cir. May 30, 1984); Plymouth-Home Nat'l
Bank v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
T 21,808 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 1983).
159. More specifically, these characteristics are: (1) The existence of "standardized
contracts for the purchase or sale of commodities which provide for future, as opposed to
immediate, delivery"; (2) transactions that are "directly or indirectly offered to the general
public"; (3) transactions that are "generally secured by earnest money, or 'margins' "; (4)
transactions that are "entered into primarily for the purpose of assuming or shifting the risk
of change in value of commodities, rather than for transferring ownership of the actual com-
modities." In re Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,941,
at 23,777 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 6, 1979).
160. Ball v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L.
REP. (CCH) 21,184 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 2, 1982); Friedman v. Dean Witter & Co., [1980-1982
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUr. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,207 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 13, 1981); Baker v.
Edward D. Jones & Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) T 21,167
(C.F.T.C. Jan. 27, 1981); see also Sherman v. Sokoloff, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] (CCH)
21,901 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1983); Berenson v. Madda Trading Co., [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,689 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 1978); Wetch v. Monex Int'l,
Ltd., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) q 21,980 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 30,
1984); Southerton v. Bache Halsey Stuart Sheilds, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,927 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 16, 1983); Tolliver v. Murlas Commodities, Inc.,
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commission merchant should have broad authority in setting mar-
gin requirements for its customers, therefore, and they have gener-
ally deferred to the discretion of the broker. This deference is af-
forded the broker because margin is a fundamental protection of
futures commission merchants who themselves are responsible to
the exchanges when customers fail to meet margin calls.
A futures commission merchant is required by the CEA to seg-
regate customer funds and can use those funds only for transac-
tions of the customer. 162 The CFTC has held that a futures com-
mission merchant violated such segregation requirements when it
used customers' funds to pay for a trading loss in a customer ac-
count caused by broker error. 6 ' This holding is premised on the
CFTC's decision that an unauthorized transaction is the position
of the futures commission agent, not the customer.6 4 Therefore,
when a futures commission agent negligently reverses the cus-
tomer's instructions, resulting in a loss for which the customer's
account is debited, the futures commission agent wrongfully
charges that customer for the futures commission agent's own
transaction. 65
Other customer claims are more difficult to establish. For ex-
ample, the CFTC has concluded that violations of exchange rules
do not permit an award of damages in reparations proceedings. 66
[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] (CCH) 21,752 (C.F.T.C. June 16, 1983); Blunt, Ellis & Loewi,
Inc. v. Ingram, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) l 21,385 (Iowa Sup.
Ct. May 19, 1982). But see Baker v. Stotler & Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur.
L. REP. (CCH) % 21,994 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 31, 1984).
161. See, e.g., Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Leach, 583 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1978);
Lincoln Commodity Servs. v. Meade, 558 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1977); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Brooks, 548 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 855
(1978); Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes v. D & G Supply & Maintenance Co., 390 F.
Supp. 715, 720 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Nichols & Co. v. Columbus Credit Corp., 204 Misc. 848,
126 N.Y.S.2d 715 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953), afl'd, 284 A.D. 870, 134 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1954). Com-
pare Flynn v. First Nat'l Monetary Corp., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 21,396 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 9, 1982) with Iowa Grain v. Farmers Grain & Feed Co., 293
N.W.2d 22 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1980).
162. See 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 1.20 (1984).
163. Hunter v. Madda Trading Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 21,242 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 2, 1981); see also Weiskopf v. Trans-American Commodity
Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] CoMm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,933 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 30,
1983); cf. Trust & Inv. AG v. Stotler & Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) T 22,122 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 1984).
164. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
165. Hunter v. Madda Trading Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 21,242, at 25,205 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 2, 1981).
166. Friedman v. Dean Witter & Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) % 21,307 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 13, 1981); Graves v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1980-
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1299
Courts have reached a similar conclusion holding that no private
right of action exists for violations of the internal policies or proce-
dures of a brokerage firm.167 Similarly, as a result of recent changes
in the CEA,"'6 the CFTC cannot award reparations against a per-
son who is not registered with it, and, recently a district court held
that there was no private right of action for the failure of a broker
to register with the CFTC.'6 9
1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,301 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 14, 1981).
167. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Goldman, 593 F.2d 129 (8th Cir.
1979); Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1975); Sherman v. Sokoloff, [1982-1984 Trans-
fer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,901 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1983); J.E. Hoetger &
Co. v. Ascencio, 572 F. Supp. 814, 821 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Chapman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 99,419 (D.
Md. July 19, 1983); Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc. v. Quinard, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,686 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. Brooks, 404 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 548 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1975);
Einhorn v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 22,100 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 20, 1984); see Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614
F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980). Contract claims do not constitute a basis for recovery under the
CEA. See Schraman v. Comvest, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 21,616 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 4, 1982); Ashlock v. Premex, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,602 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 8, 1982). But see O'Hare v.
Premex, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,708 (C.F.T.C.
Apr. 20, 1983).
168. See SENATE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY, FUTURES TRADING
ACT OF 1982, S. REP. No. 384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1982); H.R. REP. No. 565 (Pt. 1), 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 55-57 (1982). This amendment was made in the Futures Trading Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983). The CFTC, however, has determined that
these changes are not to be applied retroactively. See Nelson v. Chilcott Commodities Corp.,
[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,934 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 12, 1983).
169. J.E. Hoetger & Co. v. Ascencio, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 21,684 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 1983); see also Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523,
527 n.6 (5th Cir. 1978); Cresswell v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,859 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 1983); Hoymayer v. Dean
Witter & Co., 459 F. Supp. 733, 738-739 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Ryan v. Pearson, [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,741 (C.F.T.C. May 27, 1983). In Wood-
man v. London Commodity Options, Ltd., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 21,021 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 29, 1980), a CFTC administrative law judge ordered recission
of a futures transaction because of a failure to disclose that an individual had complied with
CFTC registration requirements. See also Maloley v. R.J. O'Brien & Assocs., 2 COMM. FuT.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 22,366 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 24, 1984). Compare also, Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co.,
634 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated, 456 U.S. 968 (1982), in which the Supreme Court
vacated a decision that had held there was no private right of action under the registration
and other provisions of the CEA. That action was based on the Supreme Court's decision in
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982), which held
there was a private right of action under some provisions of the CEA. In Eastside Church of
Christ v. National Plan, Inc., 391 F.2d 357, 362 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 913 (1968),
the court of appeals held that the failure of a broker-dealer to register with the Securities
and Exchange Commission permitted recovery on transactions effected by the broker-dealer
for a customer. In Hoetger, however, the court noted that the securities laws provide that
contracts entered into in violation of the provisions of the securities laws are "void," while
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Section 4c of the CEA170 prohibits "wash trading," "cross trad-
ing," "accommodation trading," "fictitious sales," and transactions
that cause a false price to be reported.' 71 In CFTC v. Savage7 , the
Ninth Circuit noted that such transactions were viewed by Con-
gress to be "pure, unadulterated fraud."' 73 The court held that al-
though scienter is necessary to establish a violation of section 4c, it
cannot be avoided by "willfully or carelessly induced ignorance."' 74
Another transaction prohibited by section 4b of the CEA is
referred to as "bucketing.' ' 7 5 Generally, bucketing occurs when a
broker does nothing with an order at all, simply betting that the
market will move adversely to the customer and allow the broker
to profit to the extent of the losses suffered by the customer. 6
the CEA has no comparable provision. J.E. Hoetger & Co. v. Ascencio, [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,684 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 1983). The Hoetger court
also distinguished the Curran case because Congress had not considered whether there was
a private right of action under the registration provisions of the CEA. Id. at 26,617. The
Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983), now codifies private
rights of action under the CEA. 7 U.S.C. § 25 (1982). Whether the codification would allow a
right of action for registration violations is unclear. Presently recovery is allowed only for
"actual" damages, and it may be difficult to show actual damages for mere failure to regis-
ter. See International Cattle Sys. v. Paraons, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) T 21,367 (D. Kan. Mar. 9, 1982).
170. 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1982).
171. In CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit noted that
these terms had been defined by the Commodity Exchange Authority (the predecessor to
the CFTC) as follows:
(a) "Wash trading" as "entering into or purporting to enter into transactions, for the
purpose of giving the appearance that purchase and sales are being or have been made
but without actually taking a position in the market";
(b) "Cross trading" as "indirectly bucketing a customer's order, or indirectly offsetting
the buying order of one customer against the selling order of another customer, or wash
trading by means of transactions with another floor broker who is engaged in a similar
type of trading"; and
(c) "Accommodation trading" and "wash trading entered into by one broker to assist
another broker to make cross trades, wash trades .... "
Id. at 284 n.13 (quoting Commodity Exchange Authority, Memorandum on Definition of
Certain Trade Practices Prohibited by the Commodity Exchange Act (May 25, 1966)).
172. 611 F.2d at 284.
173. Id. (citing 80 CONG. REc. 7905 (1936) (remarks of Sen. Smith)).
174. 611 F.2d at 284. The court also noted that wash trades were viewed by the Com-
modity Exchange Authority as including "the intent not to make genuine, bona fide trading
transactions in stocks or commodities." Id. (quoting In re Jean Goldwurm, 7 Agric. Dec.
265, 274 (1984)) (emphasis in original); see supra note 170 and accompanying text.
175. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982).
176. See Behl v. Stanford Management Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,935 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 7, 1983); In re Siegel Trading Co., [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) % 20,452 (C.F.T.C. July 26, 1977). Bucketing
has been referred to as the "first and fastest felony" under the CEA. Johnson, The First
and Fastest Felony: Trading Futures off the Exchanges, 35 Bus. LAW. 711, 711 (1980).
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Bucketing (in the form of "cross trading") also occurs when a bro-
ker fails to execute a customer's order and instead offsets the order
against the matching order of another customer. Bucketing is a
particularly pernicious practice because it allows a broker to favor
some customers by switching their orders to the detriment of
others. In instances where the broker does not execute the order at
all, he is simply betting against the customer. This offense is com-
pounded when the broker had advised the customer that the mar-
ket would move in a given direction and persuaded the customer to
enter into the transaction based upon the broker's prediction. The
broker bucketing the order, in such instances, is hoping that his
own advice is erroneous. Bucketing is dangerous also because the
success or failure of the transaction becomes dependent upon the
ability and willingness of the broker to pay the customer any real-
ized profits.
Manipulation of commodity futures prices is also prohibited
by the CEA."' Claims of manipulation, however, require a complex
analysis of the commodity market to determine whether manipula-
tion actually has occurred. In addition, plaintiffs have the difficult
burden of showing that the alleged manipulator acted with the in-
tent to manipulate prices.178
IV. SCIENTER REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE CEA
A determination of the standard of intent necessary to prove
that fraud has been committed is a recurring concern under the
CEA. Portions of section 4b contain an express willfulness require-
ment. The Seventh Circuit has held that willfulness is present if
the defendant acts intentionally, "irrespective of evil motive or re-
liance on erroneous advice," or if the. defendant acts with "careless
disregard."' 79 The Second Circuit has taken a similar approach,
177. 7 U.S.C. § 13b (1982).
178. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
932 (1972); G.H. Miller & Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 907 (1959); Great W. Food Distribs., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953); Strobl v. New York Mercantile Exch., [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,050 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1984); In re Collins, [1982-
1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,008 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 3, 1984); In re
Collins, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,960 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 10,
1984); In re Cox, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) T 21,767 (C.F.T.C.
Jan. 3, 1983); In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Assoc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,796 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 17, 1982).
179. Goodman v. Benson, 286 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1961); accord Silverman v.
CFTC, 549 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir. 1977); see also In re Williams, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) T 20,560 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 13, 1978).
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holding that a defendant need not have "an evil motive or an af-
firmative intent to injure his customer" or a subjective intent to
cheat or defraud; all that is required is a knowing, intentional
act.180 Other circuits have demanded at least a recklessness stan-
dard before finding scienter. The Ninth Circuit held that scienter
to establish a violation of section 4b is present when one acts in
"careless disregard of whether his acts amount to cheating, filing
false reports, etc."18 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit held that con-
duct must be purposeful or intentionally deceptive to violate sec-
tion 4b and that mere negligence, mistake or inadvertance is not
sufficient to establish liability."" The CFTC, however, has taken a
broader view. In Gordon v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 83 the
CFTC rejected any scienter requirement under section 4b, holding
that unintentional or negligent violations of any part of the CEA
would be sufficient to establish a violation. Although this decision
was later affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in an unpublished opinion,
the court affirmed on the basis that scienter was present in that
180. Haltmier v. CFTC, 554 F.2d 556, 562 (2d Cir. 1977); see also McIliroy v. Dittmer,
[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,076 (8th Cir. Apr. 11, 1984).
See generally Markham & Meltzer, Secondary Liability Under the Commodity Exchange
Act-Respondeat Superior, Aiding and Abetting, Supervision, and Scienter, 27 EMORY L.J.
1115, 1165-70 (1978) (discussion of scienter in commodities fraud); cf. Minpeco S.A. v. Con-
ticommodity Servs., Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 21,625
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1982); Gordon v. Hunt, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 21,626 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1982).
181. CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 283 (9th Cir. 1979). The court also stated that a
finding of scienter could not be avoided by "ignorance brought about by willfully or care-
lessly ignoring the truth." Id.
182. Master Commodities, Inc. v. Texas Cattle Management Co., 586 F.2d 1352, 1356
(10th Cir. 1978); see also McIlroy v. Dittmer, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] CoMm. Fur. L.
REP. (CCH) I 22,076 (8th Cir. Apr. 11, 1984); First Commodity Corp. v. CFTC, 676 F.2d 1,
5-6 (1st Cir. 1982); Bowersox v. First Commodity Corp., 2 COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH)
I 22,248 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 1984); Peavey Co. v. Mitchell, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) I 21,939 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 30, 1983); Herman v. T. & S. Com-
modities, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) I 22,093 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 15, 1983); Palmer Trading Co. v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) I 20,900 (N.D. IMI. Apr. 20, 1979).
183. [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) I 21,016 (C.F.T.C. Apr.
10, 1980), afl'd sub nom., Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc. v. CFTC, Civ. No. 80-7212 (9th Cir.
Feb. 12, 1982) (unpublished). Compare Hardiman v. Nelson, Ghun & Assocs., [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) I 21,629 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 30, 1982) (negligent
failure to notify customer of what was happening with his account was not fraudulent) with
Swiers v. Rosenthal & Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) I 21,817
(C.F.T.C. May 27, 1983) (failure to discuss the mechanics and risks of option trading with
customer coupled with extravagant claims of profits was fraudulent). See also Sudal v.
Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH)
1 22,112 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 27, 1984); Taylor v. Peabody Trading Co., [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) I 21,738 (C.F.T.C. May 31, 1983).
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In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder'8 5 the Supreme Court held
that scienter was required under section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 s18 and rule 10b-5.187 The Supreme Court has
stated that these provisions are "similar" to the provisions of sec-
tion 4b of the CEA.' s The Supreme Court also held in Aaron v.
SEC,18 9 that scienter is required under certain of the antifraud
provisions of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,190 but, in-
congruously, concluded that other portions of that statute did not
contain such a requirement. Although confusing, the Court's deci-
sions in Aaron and Hochfelder draw a distinction between those
instances in which a statute prohibits fraudulent acts, which re-
quire scienter, and those instances in which a statute prohibits the
effects of an act. If the effect of the act is to defraud regardless of
the intent of the actor, the statute does not require scienter. This
rationale leaves judicial interpretation of section 4b uncertain be-
cause the language of the statute differs substantially from the
provisions addressed by the Court in Aaron and Hochfelder.'9'
Since Aaron, the CFTC appears to have retreated from its
previous position in Gordon.192 Thus, the CFTC has since stated
that the antifraud provisions of section 4b "should not be applied
to situations . . . where the failure to obey the customer's instruc-
tions results not from any fraudulent conduct but rather from a
184. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc. v. CFTC, Civ. No. 80-7212 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 1982).
Unpublished decisions of the Ninth Circuit, under the rules of that Circuit, are not to be
cited for authority. In Stiller v. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) T 21,780 (C.F.T.C. July 11, 1983), the CFTC held that an admin-
istrative law judge had erred in holding that the CEA was violated under a theory that the
complainant would not have opened an account and suffered trading losses had it been in-
formed that the respondent would subsequently violate CFTC regulations. The CFTC
stated:
Without evidence of respondents' intent, or evidence from which one may infer such
intent, at the time complainants opened their account, a breach of duty at some later
time cannot transform prior statements into implied misrepresentations that serve as a
ground for an award based on fraud in the inducement.
Id. at 27,156 n.5.
185. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 78jjj(b) (1982).
187. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
188. See Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 394-95
(1982).
189. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
190. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982).
191. See Markham, The Seventh Amendment and CFTC Reparation Proceedings, 68
IOWA L. REv. 87, 116-17 (1982).
192. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
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clerical error - albeit negligent .... ."193 CFTC administrative
law judges have concluded that a broker does not violate section 4b
if he or she exercises due care,"" and that breaches of contract are
not violations of the CEA,195 but a failure to follow customer in-
structions may still be held to be fraudulent.196
Other antifraud provisions in CFTC rules and the CEA are
equally confusing in their scienter standards. For example, the
CFTC sought to eliminate any willfulness requirement from its an-
193. Hunter v. Madda Trading Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 21,242, at 25,204 n.8 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 2, 1981). The CFTC nevertheless found a
violation in Hunter of § 4d of the CEA. 7 U.S.C. § 6d (1982). Section 4d requires customer
funds to be kept in segregated trust funds and permits brokerage firms to use those funds
only for customer obligations. In Hunter the CFTC concluded that the error was not an
obligation of the customer, and, therefore, the broker was not authorized to remove the
customer's funds from the segregated account to pay for the error. This, of course, allows
the CFTC to impose liability in a broad array of situations that would otherwise be the
subject of a fraud claim. See Markham, Developments in Commodities Litigation, 14 REv.
SEC. REG. 843 (Oct. 1981).
194. See Bond v. Comvest, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 21,437 (C.F.T.C. June 18, 1982); Nebeck v. First Nat'l Monetary Corp., [1980-1982
Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,398 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 16, 1982); Flynn v.
First Nat'l Monetary Corp., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
21,396 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 9, 1982); Piccioli v. Rosenthal & Co., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,927 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 26, 1979); Issac v. Conticommodity
Servs., Inc., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,606 (C.F.T.C. May
10, 1978); Friedman v. Dean Witter & Co., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUr. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,539 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 27, 1977), afi'd, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 21,307 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 13, 1981); Tomasian v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham &
Co., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) T 20,433 (C.F.T.C. June 8,
1977); Rude v. Larson, 207 N.W.2d 709, 711 (Minn. 1973). These cases are discussed in
Markham, Commodities Litigation Developments-1982, 15 REv. SEC. REG. 795, 799 n.52
(1982); see also Hardiman v. Nelson, Ghun & Assocs., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,629 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 30, 1982) (mere negligence does not violate the
CEA); Gordon v. Hunt, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,626
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1982) (intent to deceive is an essential element of a claim alleging fraud);
Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L.
REP. (CCH) F 21,625 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1982) (intent is an essential element of a charge of
fraud); cf. Kao v. Ace Am., Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
T 21,669 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 21, 1983) (recklessness is sufficient for a violation of § 4b of the
CEA).
195. Schramm v. Comvest, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 21,616 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 4, 1982); Ashlock v. Premex, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,602 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 8, 1982).
196. Jackson v. Premex, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
1 21,618 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 17, 1982); Caldwell v. Miller-Jesser, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,614 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 14, 1982); cf. Millman v. Inter-
national Precious Metals Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH)
1 21,663 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 27, 1982) (failure to follow customer's instructions not a violation
of the Commodity Exchange Act because the customer could not prove that he gave an
unequivocal instruction).
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tifraud rule for commodity options,1 97 but the courts have divided
on whether scienter is required under the rule.198 Equally confus-
ing is the CFTC antifraud rule concerning the trading of foreign
futures contracts in the United States. 199 Although modeled after
section 4b of the CEA, this rule does not contain an express will-
fulness requirement. The First Circuit held that the rule requires a
finding of reckless conduct. 00 The CFTC, however, held that the
same antifraud rule does not require willful conduct to establish a
violation. 01 The Seventh Circuit also concluded that the CFTC
antifraud rule for leverage contracts does not include a scienter re-
quirement.0 2 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that the CFTC
antifraud provision for commodity pools and commodity trading
advisors 203 does not require scienter.2 0 4 These provisions contain
language similar to that in rule 10b-5 and section 17(a) of the Se-
curities Act of 1933, which raises the question whether Hochfelder
or Aaron ultimately will control the application of scienter.
In sum, courts tend to require some element of scienter in es-
tablishing a fraud violation under the CEA and its regulations.
Nevertheless, careful scrutiny must be given to the specific an-
tifraud provision at issue and alternative provisions of the CEA
must be examined to determine if liability may be imposed with-
out a requirement of scienter.
197. 17 C.F.R. § 32.9 (1984). The CFTC modeled this rule after § 4b but eliminated
the willfulness language. See 40 Fed. Reg. 26,504 (1975).
198. Compare CFTC v. J.S. Love & Assocs. Options, Ltd., 422 F. Supp. 652, 659-60
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (CFTC rule 30.01 can be violated absent "willful misconduct") with CFTC
v. United States Metals Depository Co., 468 F. Supp. 1149, 1162 n.55 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(CFTC need not prove scienter in order to establish that defendant violated the law) and
CFTC v. Sterling Capital Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
21,169, at 24,787 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 20, 1981) (scienter or willful misconduct is a required
element for a violation of 4b(A)) and Gravois v. Fairchild, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,706, at 22,878 (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 1978) (willful misconduct
required to establish misrepresentation).
199. 17 C.F.R. § 30.02 (1981).
200. See First Commodity Corp. v. CFTC, 676 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1982).
201. See Ruddy v. First Commodity Corp., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUtr.
L. REP. (CCH) % 21,435, at 26,084 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 31, 1981); see also Aronow v. First Nat'l
Monetary Corp., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) T 22,282 (C.F.T.C. June 13, 1984) (antifraud
rule for leverage contract does not contain security requirement).
202. See CFTC v. Premex, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 21,229, at 25,125 (7th Cir. July 28, 1981).
203. See 7 U.S.C. § 60 (1982).
204. See CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 283 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Bowersox v. First
Commodity Corp., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 22,248, at 29,282 n.2 (N.D. Cal. June 27,
1984); Taylor v. Peabody Trading Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP.
(CCH) 21,926 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 17, 1983).
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V. SECONDARY LIABILITY UNDER THE CEA
Section 2(a)(1) of the CEA20 5 establishes statutory liability
under the doctrine of respondeat superior for persons subject to
the Act. The CFTC has sought to apply this standard broadly to
impose liability upon brokerage firms and agents. In In re Big Red
Commodity Corp.2 °6 a futures commission merchant was held lia-
ble by a CFTC administrative law judge for the fraudulent acts of
one of its employees, even though the futures commission
merchant was unaware of the fraud and did not "knowingly par-
ticipate" in that fraud.2 °7
Subsequent to the decision in Big Red Commodity, Congress
enacted a "controlling person" provision that precludes imposition
of liability upon "any person who directly or indirectly, controls
any person who has violated any provision of" the CEA unless it is
proven that "the controlling person did not act in good faith or
knowingly induced directly or indirectly, the act or acts constitut-
ing the violation. '20 8 In adopting this provision, Congress made
clear its intention that the respondeat superior provision of sec-
tion 2(a)(1) "not be used as a basis for imputing liability to a con-
trolling person of a firm for acts of an employee or agent of the
firm since it does not include the protections that have been care-
205. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (1982).
206. [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,390 (C.F.T.C. Feb.
23, 1982). The associated person of the futures commission merchant was also the president
of an unrelated commodity pool. The associated person defrauded the pool in his capacity
as president, and the administrative law judge imputed that fraud to the futures commis-
sion merchant. Id. at 26,479. But see Bennett v. E.F. Hutton Co., 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) No. 48, at 1934 (N.D. Ohio, Nov. 28, 1984). In Kessenich v. Rosenthal & Co., [1980-
1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 21,181 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 21, 1981), the
CFTC refused to hold individual general partners of a partnership liable for violations of
the CEA "[a]bsent proof of active participation in or aiding and abetting of the fraudulent
course of conduct" of their employees. Id. at 24,866 n.15. The CFTC nevertheless noted that
the general partners could be liable for damages because of their absolute liability as part-
ners, even though they themselves did not violate the statute. Id.; see also CFTC v. Com-
modities Fluctuations Sys., Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Behl v. Stanford Man-
agement Corp., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,353 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 10, 1984); Imhof v.
Weinberg Bros. & Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 22,096
(C.F.T.C. Apr. 25, 1984).
207. In re Big Red Commodity Corp., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 21,390, at 25,884 (C.F.TC. Feb. 23, 1982); see also Nobel v. Williston Corp.,
[1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,227 (C.F.T.C. July 24, 1981);
Perkins v. First London Commodity, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,659 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 15, 1978); McHaney v. Winchester-Hardin-Oppenheimer
Trading Co., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,586 (C.F.T.C.
Apr. 3, 1978); Markham & Meltzer, supra note 180, at 1125-34.
208. H.R. REP. No. 964, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1982).
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fully articulated in the ... [controlling person provision] and
would make a nullity of that provision. '209 The controlling person
provision does not permit imposition of liability for monetary dam-
ages; rather it is directed for use in CFTC proceedings. Therefore,
the provision appears to preclude damage actions when a control-
ling person relationship is asserted as the basis for liability.210
The CEA also contains a specific statutory provision that im-
poses liability upon anyone who aids and abets the violations of
another.211 The CFTC has stated that liability for aiding and abet-
ting may be imposed only when there is "proof of a specific unlaw-
ful intent to further the underlying violation," and "one must
knowingly associate himself with an unlawful venture, participate
in it as something that he wishes to bring about and seek by his
action to make it succeed.12 12 A CFTC hearing officer, however,
209. Id.; see Bowersox v. First Commodity Corp., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
1 22,248 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 1984).
210. The federal securities laws also contain a "controlling person" provision, but do
not contain an express respondeat superior provision such as that in the CEA. Courts have
expressed differing views on whether a controlling person provision precludes application of
a common law respondeat superior liability under the federal securities laws. See Sharp v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 181-83 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982);
Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 712-16 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1011 (1980); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1025 (1975); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton 422 F.2d 1124, 1130 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
211. 7 U.S.C. § 13c(a) (1982).
212. In re Richardson Sec., Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) % 21,145, at 24,642, 24,646 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 27, 1981). The CFTC stated in its Richard-
son opinion that scienter would be required even if it is not required for the underlying
violation upon which the aiding and abetting liability is based. Id. at 24,646 n.4; see also
Causle v. Mason Nugent & Co., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,346 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28,
1984); Barlas v. Munir, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,224
(E.D.N.Y. July 14, 1981); Bowersox v. First Commodity Corp., 2 COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH)
1 22,248 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 1984); Sirois v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 22,306 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 3, 1984); Bogard v. Abraham-Rietz &
Co., 2 COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 1 22,273 (C.F.T.C. July 5, 1984); Vehik v. Incomco, Inc.,
[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) V 21,633 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 18, 1982);
In re Earl K. Riley Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,854
(C.F.T.C. Nov. 24, 1981). In In re Lincolnwood Commodities, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) T 21,986 (C.F.T.C. Jan. 31, 1984), the CFTC stated that, while
an aider and abettor must know that the principal's activity was unlawful, a claimed igno-
rance of the law is not a defense. The CFTC also concluded that knowledge may be inferred
from all the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 28,255; cf. King v. First London Commodity,
Ltd., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) % 22,201 (C.F.T.C. May 24, 1984) (no direct evidence that
defendant aided and abetted the fraudulent conduct); Cox v. Eastern Capital Corp., [1982-
1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) % 22,009 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 16, 1984) (no
liability for aiding and abetting despite availability to the defendant of "strong evidence of
wrongdoing" by the agent).
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imposed a reparations award against a salesman even though he
had not been aware of the fraud committed by his firm.213 The
hearing officer concluded that the salesman had benefited by re-
ceiving commissions and ordered the salesman to repay the
amount of his enrichment. 14 In 1982 the aiding and abetting pro-
visions of the CEA were amended to allow aiding and abetting lia-
bility to be imposed in private actions for damages. 15 Previously,
the statute had been limited in applicability to CFTC administra-
tive proceedings.
Another form of secondary liability under the CEA is found in
a CFTC regulation that requires commodity professionals to super-
vise their employees.216 In Big Red Commodity,1 7 a CFTC admin-
istrative law judge concluded that a futures commission merchant
had failed to supervise properly a salesperson who had carried out
a fraud in an unrelated commodity pool in his capacity as presi-
dent of the pool. ' Declining to enumerate any supervisory failures
213. Zia v. United States Inv. Co., [1982-1984] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,613
(C.F.T.C. Oct. 25, 1982).
214. Id. at 26,344; see also In re International Commodities Corp., [1982-19841 COMM.
FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,822 (C.F.T.C. May 23, 1983); cf. Middleton v. Neil Stephens As-
socs., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,923 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 30,
1983) (president and vice president of firm not liable despite firm's liability); Lin v. Boston
Trading Group, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,731
(C.F.T.C. Apr. 22, 1983) (salesman not liable for excessive commissions resulting from the
fraudulent conduct of his employer because, inter alia, he received no commissions); Joslyn
v. United States Inv. Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) % 21,711
(C.F.T.C. Apr. 22, 1983) (person who did nothing more than solicit account that was later
deemed to involve fraudulent claims was liable for the amount of his commissions on the
sale because "he should have had some idea that matters may not have been what they
seemed"); Vehik v. Incomco, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
21,633 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 18, 1982) (that defendant was president of the futures commission
merchant and "expressed knowledge of and responsibility for the handling of the account"
is insufficient to show that defendant aided and abetted churning of the account by a busi-
ness associate).
215. See 7 U.S.C. § 25 (1982). The courts were previously divided on whether the limi-
tation on the application of aiding and abetting liability to CFTC proceedings precluded its
application in private actions. Compare Strax v. Commodity Exch., Inc., [1980-1982 Trans-
fer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,243 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 1981) (no private right
of action available) with Barlas v. Munir [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) T 21,224 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 1981) (private right of action available).
216. 17 C.F.R. § 166.3 (1984); Rosen and Shapiro, Regulation 166.3: Actions Under
the Diligent Supervision Rule, (Part II) 4 Comm. L. Letter 3 (Nov. 1984).
217. [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,390 (C.F.T.C. Feb.
23, 1982); see supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
218. In re Big Red Commodity Corp., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L.
REP. (CCH) % 21,390, at 25,884 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 23, 1982); see also CFTC v. Commodities
Fluctuations Sys., Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Shoshaoni v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2 COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 22,271 (C.F.T.C. July 10,
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on which to base liability, the administrative law judge determined
that the lack of "reasonable supervisory procedures" itself demon-
strated a lack of supervision. 19
VI. FIDUCIARY DUTIES UNDER THE CEA
A frequent issue raised in CEA cases is whether brokers owe
their customers a fiduciary duty and, if so, what is the extent of
that duty. In Robinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc.,220 an action for losses in trading commodity futures contracts,
the district court held that "absent an express investment advisory
contract there is no fiduciary duty unless the customer is infirm or
ignorant of business affairs." '' In Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc.,222 however, the district court held that a
securities broker owed certain duties even to a nondiscretionary
account, including: (1) the duty to recommend a stock only after
being informed as to its nature, price and financial prognosis; (2)
the duty to execute the customer's orders promptly; (3) the duty to
inform the customer of the risks involved in purchasing or selling
the security; (4) the duty to refrain from self-dealing or failing to
disclose any interests of the broker in a recommended security; (5)
1984); Berisko v. Easter Capitol Corp., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,274 (C.F.T.C. June
27, 1984); Boissonneau v. Dameron, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 22,016 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 22, 1984); Blome v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., [1982-1984 Trans-
fer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,916 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 18, 1983); Roberts v. Lin-
colnwood Commodities, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
21,699 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 4, 1983); Shoshaoni v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,271 (1984); Berisko v. Easter Capital Corp., 2 CoMM. FUT.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 22,274 (1984).
219. In re Big Red Commodity Corp., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 21,390, at 25,884 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 23, 1982). The CFTC has stated that wrong-
ful acts by an employee can be a strong indication of inadequate supervision, but that it
"recognizes that the performance of a wrongful act by an employee of a commodity firm in
the course of his employment does not necessarily mean that the employee was improperly
supervised .... " Proposed Standards of Conduct, supra note 57, at 44,747; see also Sher-
man v. Sokoloff, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. 1 21,901 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
12, 1983) (the court held that a broker was not required to supervise a third party managing
a customer's account); CFTC v. J.S. Love & Assocs. Options, Ltd., 422 F. Supp. 652, 660
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (the court declined to establish the standard of absolute liability for failure
to supervise); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (every violation
of law "by a salesman does not necessarily imply a breach of the employer's duty to super-
vise" trading). For a discussion on the importance of supervision requirements in the con-
text of federal securities laws, see Longstreth, Duty to Supervise Is Critical to Effective
Self-Regulation, Nat'l L.J., May 16, 1983, at 24, col. 1.
220. 337 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Ala. 1971), a/I'd, 453 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1972).
221. Id. at 113; see also McGinn v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 736
F.2d 1254 (8th Cir. 1984).
222. 461 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
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the duty not to misrepresent any material fact; and (6) the duty to
execute orders only after receiving prior authorization from the
customer. 223 The Court in Leib further stated that when the ac-
count is a discretionary one, the broker becomes the fiduciary of
the customer in a "broad sense," and is required to: (1) manage the
account to comport with the needs and objectives of the customer;
(2) keep informed of changes in the market and act responsively to
such changes; (3) keep his customer informed as to each completed
transaction; and (4) explain the practical impact and potential
risks of the course of dealing in which the broker is engaged. 24
It is unclear whether the standards in Leib will be applied to
the commodities area, particularly in light of the rejection by
courts of a suitability standard in commodities trading.2 5 The
CFTC has concluded that a fiduciary relationship does exist be-
tween a broker and customer 2 6 and, therefore, even negligent con-
duct may constitute fraud under section 4b of the CEA.22 As pre-
223. Id. at 953. The court also stated:
Of course the precise manner in which a broker performs these duties will depend
to some degree upon the intelligence and personality of his customer. For example,
where the customer is uneducated or generally unsophisticated with regard to financial
matters, the broker will have to define the potential risks of a particular transaction
carefully and cautiously. Conversely, where a customer fully understands the dynamics
of the stock market or is personally familiar with a security, the broker's explanation of
such risks may be merely perfunctory.
Id. at 953; see also, Kenny v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,924 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 10, 1983).
In Marchese v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,217
(9th Cir. June 1, 1984), the court held that a broker is in a fiduciary relationship with his
customers and has an "affirmative duty of utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure of
all material facts." Id. at 29,146 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180, 194 (1963)). In Ray E. Friedman & Co. v. Jenkins, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
T 22,241 (8th Cir. June 28, 1984), however, the court held that when a nondiscretionary
account is controlled by a customer, a fiduciary duty does not attach. See also McGinn v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2 COMm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 1 22,242 (8th Cir.
June 22, 1984).
224. Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. at 953 (cita-
tions omitted).
225. See supra notes 48-71 and accompanying text. Compare Marchese v. Shearson
Hayden Stone, Inc., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,217 (9th Cir. June 1, 1984) (A com-
modity broker has a fiduciary relationship with his customers.) with Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Trabuluski, Civ. No. 83-5987 (9th Cir. 1984) (mem.) (no fiduciary
duty where broker is simply executing orders) and Ray E. Friedman & Co. v. Jenkins, 2
COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) I 22,241 (8th Cir. June 28, 1984) (no fiduciary duty owed to a
client with a nondiscretionary account).
226. Gordon v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT.
L. REP. (CCH) 21,016 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 10, 1980), affd sub nom. Shearson Loeb Rhoades
Inc., Civ. No. 80-7212 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 1982) (unpublished opinion).
227. The fiduciary duty of brokers is described by the CFTC as follows:
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viously discussed,22 8 the courts, however, have rejected negligence
as a sufficient basis to establish fraud. Nevertheless, the CFTC in a
recent decision229 once again stated that commodity professionals
necessarily stand in a fiduciary relationship with their customers.
In that decision, the CFTC held that a commodity trading advisor
was liable for creating the false expectation that all of a customer's
capital would not be at risk in the market.3 0
In Wattay v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. 23 1 the CFTC
stated that a brokerage firm employee rendering trading advice to
customers had a fiduciary obligation to know all material facts that
could affect the customer's trading decision and to disclose the
same to the customer. In contrast, in Rasheed v. Heinold Corn-
For example, although an associated person may act for some customers only as
the conduit for orders by transmitting the orders to an exchange floor for execution, for
other customers the associated person may act in an advisory capacity. In the latter
case, as here, the scope of an associated person's duties to that customer broadens
substantially.
As a fiduciary, an associated person giving commodity trading advice has a duty to
know all material market facts which are reasonably ascertainable in connection with a
customer's trading decision . . . . In addition, such as associated persons [sic] has a
fiduciary duty to disclose these material facts to his customers.
Id. at 23,981 (footnotes omitted); see also, Notkin v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.,
[1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,236 (C.F.T.C. Aug. 25, 1981).
228. See supra notes 179-204 and accompanying text.
229. Graves v. Futures Inv. Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 21,457, at 26,165 n.20 (C.F.T.C. June 3, 1982).
230. Id.; cf. Sudol v. Shearson Loeb Rhodes, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 22,112 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 27, 1984). But see Peavey Co. v. Mitchell [1982-
1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,939 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 30, 1983).
231. No. R 76-22 (C.F.T.C. Apr. 20, 1981); accord Vetrons v. American Ace, Inc.,
[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) V 21,726 (C.F.T.C. May 4, 1983);
see also Domenico v. Rufenacht, Bromegan & Hertz, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,892 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 31, 1983); Stevens v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
1 21,839 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 8, 1983); Campbell v. International Precious Metals Corp., [1982-
1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. Rav. (CCH) 21,816 (C.F.T.C. July 22, 1983); New-
man v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP.
(CCH) 21,811 (C.F.T.C. July 19, 1983); Sturcken v. Clayton Brokerage Co., [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] (CCH) 21,727 (C.F.T.C. May 10, 1983); Roberts v. Lincolnwood Com-
modities, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,699 (C.F.T.C. Mar.
24, 1983); Mohr v. Gregory Commodity Options, Ltd., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] (CCH)
1 21,688 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 24, 1983); cf. Graves v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1980-1982
Transfer Binder], COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,301, at 25,522 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 14, 1981)
(futures commission merchant did not violate 4b(A) of the Commodity Exchange Act by
failing to notify customer that his account fell below the required minimum equity). In
Fizell v. Cayman Assocs., Ltd., No. R 79-383-80-109 (C.F.T.C. Feb. 22, 1983), a CFTC ad-
ministrative law judge stated that "[a]s fiduciaries, salesmen have a duty to investigate to
determine whether there is an adequate basis for opinions rendered."
CUSTOMER RIGHTS
modities, Inc. 232 the CFTC stated that an administrative law
judge's finding that a respondent had breached its fiduciary duty
by failing to disclose material facts would have been better ana-
lyzed as a case of misrepresentation rather than using a breach of
fiduciary duty as a basis for liability.33 Regardless of the scope of
the duty, a broker is not "a human ticker tape machine who must
spend every minute of the day reporting the current floor bids to
his customers.
'234
The CFTC recently proposed an amendment to its Risk Dis-
closure Statements that would require these documents to state
that a commodity professional is not relieved of its disclosure re-
sponsibilities merely by having a customer sign the Risk Disclosure
Statement and that the Risk Disclosure Statement is not the ex-
clusive disclosure requirement under the CEA.235 The CFTC based
this proposal on its assertion that commodity professionals stand
in a fiduciary relationship with their customers and that the Risk
Disclosure Statement may not, in all circumstances, meet the pro-
fessionals' fiduciary obligations of disclosure.2 36 Because of the
CFTC's assertion of such a fiduciary duty, this proposal has met
with strong industry opposition.
VII. FORUMS AVAILABLE FOR CUSTOMER REMEDIES
A. Reparation Proceedings
The CEA contains a unique provision that allows the CFTC to
award damages to customers in "reparations" proceedings for vio-
lations of the CEA by persons registered with the CFTC.3 7 To ful-
fill this responsibility, the CFTC utilizes administrative law judges
232. [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 21,837 (C.F.T.C. Aug.
19, 1983).
233. Id. at 27,526 n.4.
234. Gregor v. Rosenthal & Co., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMm. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) T 20,708, at 22,888 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 21, 1978); see also cases cited in Markham, supra
note 194, at 789-99.
235. 47 Fed. Reg. 52,723 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 2), noted in Risk Dis-
closure by Futures Commission Merchants, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) I 21,620 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 23, 1982).
236. Id. The CFTC release went to great lengths to establish a fiduciary relationship.
It also noted that the duties of such a relationship vary substantially depending on the
customer. "For example, it seems clear that the scope of ... disclosure obligations is sub-
stantially broader ... in an advisory capacity for a customer than when simply transmit-
ting a customer's orders to an exchange floor for execution." Id. at 26,360; see also Git-
temeier v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) I 21,929 (C.F.T.C. Nov. 30, 1983).
237. 7 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1982).
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to hear evidence and make initial decisions. Governed by extensive
CFTC regulations,2"" the CEA makes provision for cases to be
heard without the requirement of a costly hearing.231 9
After an administrative law judge renders a decision, an ap-
peal may be made to the CFTC, but the CFTC may determine not
to review the administrative law judge's action. 40 In the event of
such review, or refusal to review, a person adversely affected by a
reparations decision may seek further review before a court of ap-
peals. When a party refuses to pay a reparation award, a federal
district court may enforce the award.241 Although the CFTC pro-
vides for counterclaims by brokers in federal district court pro-
ceedings,242 a recent circuit court decision held that the Act did not
permit this. 43
In the past, CFTC reparations proceedings were plagued by
delays because of an unexpectedly large number of claims made by
commodity options customers.244 Recent legislation245 and the
CFTC's modification of its rules2 46 have streamlined these proceed-
ings. No provision exists for a jury trial in reparation proceedings
for either a customer or a broker.2 41 This disadvantage may be off-
set by the expedition of proceedings resulting from the expertise of
CFTC administrative law judges. Punitive damages have not been
awarded in reparations proceedings and discovery rights are
limited.24 s
238. 17 C.F.R. §§ 12.1-.27 (1984).
239. See Horwitz & Markham, supra note 41, at 94-95; Rosen, Reparation Proceed-
ings Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 27 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1978); Shipe, Private Liti-
gation Before the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 33 AD. L. REV. 153 (1981);.
240. 17 C.F.R. § 12.401 (1984).
241. 7 U.S.C. § 18(d) (1982).
242. 17 C.F.R. § 12.19 (1984).
243. Schor v. CFTC, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,297 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10), reh'g
denied, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 22,297 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
244. See S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1978).
245. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1982). These
changes included the elimination of reparations proceedings against persons who are not
registered with the CFTC. Congress found that such claims were frequently uncollectible
and served only to delay other reparation cases. See S. REP. No. 384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 48
(1982). The CFTC, however, has decided not to apply this change retroactively. Nelson v.
Chilcott Commodities Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
21,934 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 12, 1983).
246. 17 C.F.R. §§ 12.1-.408 (1984).
247. See Markham, supra note 191, at 88.
248. See 17 C.F.R. § 12 (1984). The CFTC discovery rule for reparations does not




The CEA provides for exchanges to maintain arbitration fo-
rums for customer claims.24 9 A customer, however, is not required
to submit to arbitration; the agreement to do so must be "volun-
tary." CFTC regulations governing voluntary arbitration require
specified language that must be contained in the customer's ac-
count agreement and a separate customer signature agreeing to ar-
bitration.15 0 Arbitration offers the advantages of speed, lack of
publicity, and reduced costs because of the absence of the formal
procedures of federal district court litigation or reparations pro-
ceedings. Further, rights of appeal are extremely limited and
awards are generally final.251 As with reparations proceedings, no
provision for a jury trial exists and discovery, if permitted at all, is
generally very limited.
C. Private Rights of Action
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Penner & Smith v. Curran,5 2 the
Supreme Court held that a private right of action exists for some
violations of the CEA. Subsequently, the CEA was amended to re-
flect this holding and the CEA now allows private damages actions
253 acfor violations of its provisions. These actions, however, may be
brought only by traders, and not by persons indirectly affected.
The legislation limits actions against the exchange by requiring
that a plaintiff show that the exchange acted in bad faith.254
Federal court litigation, of course, may be more expensive and
time consuming than arbitration or reparations, but it offers the
advantages of full discovery, the right to a jury trial, and the full
right of appeal.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The CFTC has now been in existence for over ten years, and a
rapidly developing body of case law has done much to clarify the
applicable standards for customer protection under the Commod-
ity Exchange Act. The CFTC has actively sought legislation in ar-
249. 7 U.S.C. § 7(a)(11) (1982); see Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co. v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
1 21,942 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 1983).
250. 17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1-.5 (1984).
251. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
252. 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
253. 7 U.S.C. § 25 (1982).
254. Horwitz & Markham, supra note 41, at 97-98.
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eas in which it has found customer protection wanting. A number
of issues are, however, in need of additional clarification. More de-
finitive standards and guidelines are needed for determining
whether the level of trading in a customer's account is so excessive
as to constitute churning. Additional standards should be estab-
lished for unauthorized trading. The overwhelming number of
cases arising under the Commodity Exchange Act are claims of un-
authorized trading-claims that all too frequently appear to be
motivated by the unprofitable nature of the transaction rather
than a concern over lack of authority. These abuses could be
stemmed, for example, by establishing more exact requirements on
the duty to complain-thus reducing the number of claims and
greatly alleviating the litigation calendars of the CFTC and the
courts.
Finally, the creation of a National Futures Association should
permit the development of a nationwide arbitration system that
will permit speedy resolutions of customer disputes without pro-
hibitive costs. The development and use of expert arbitrators
should preclude the necessity of long explanations of the futures
markets or the use of experts to describe those markets. The Arbi-
tration Projects National Futures Association also should hasten






























JAMES M. HEAD, JR.

























EDMUND L. CAREY, JR.
JOHN A. COATES
BARBARA A. COUCH
L. ALLYN DIXON, JR.
DAVID L. EADES
TODD S. FAIRCHILD
ERIC R. FENICHEL
MARCIA L. FINKELSTEIN
TIM K. GARRErr
SUSAN L. GOODMAN
STEVEN SAMUEL GRIFFIN
RICK HALL
CATHERINE EVANS HANCOCK
ANNE HARDIMAN
RICHARD R. HAYS
ALAN D. HEGI
JOSEPHINE H. HICKS
WILLIAM B. HOBBS
ANDREW M. HUTCHER
CHRISTINA A. KARCHER
JANE WELLS MAY
RONALD D. MAY
LISA M. NAPOLETANO
ADAM K. PECK
LISA MENAKER QUINN
CYNTHIA YOUNG REISZ
MICHAEL RICE
ELIZABETH ANN WATERS
RON WEST
DARYL S. WICKSTROM
ROBERT N. COVINGTON
Faculty Advisor
JUDY SHARP
Executive Secretary

